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Endangered species protection has long been favored by
many Americans, who watched regretfully as the numbers of
American eagles, buffaloes and other species dwindled toward
extinction. Only recentl, however, has species protection be-
come a matter ofpublic controversy, subsumed in the more gen-
eral "development v. environment" debate. In this Article,
Professor Rosenberg surveys the federal government's role in
speciesprotection, with a specialfocus on the Endangered Spe-
cies Act of 1973. Prompted by the much-publicized Supreme
Court decision in the "snail darter case"--TVA v. Hill-Con-
gress extensively amended the Act in 1978. After a detailed
analysis of these amendments, Professor Rosenberg concludes
that, though Congress made some signtfcant changes in thefed-
eral system of species protection, the strong pro-species policy
embodied in the 1973 Act remains intact.
I. INTRODUCTION
Society's awareness of environmental interests continues to expand
as events place increasing varieties of environmental concerns before
the public. The nuclear power incident at the Three Mile Island power
plant' provides a chilling example of one serious environmental prob-
lem. But beyond the confines of the obvious issues involving nuclear
safety or air and water pollution, there is a growing consciousness of
specialized environmental problems that have previously escaped the
attention of the legal profession and the general public.2 One of these
t Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law. B.A. 1971, Columbia University; Masters of Regional Planning 1974 and J.D. 1975, Univer-
sity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the
Cleveland-Marshall Fund, which provided a research grant that enabled the author to undertake
this project.
1. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1979, at I, col 2 (city ed.).
2. An increasing amount of environmental litigation is being brought by individuals and
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interests-endangered species protection-serves as the focus of this
Article. That society has acted to protect this special interest may be
surprising at a time when environmental protection activities in general
have been challenged on economic grounds as being inflationary and
as inefficient allocations of resources.' In spite of these economically
based attacks upon environmental regulation, congressional and judi-
cial support for endangered species protection has continued.
This area of federal regulatory policy is especially important be-
cause it concerns the preservation of unique, irreplaceable environmen-
tal assets. The protection of these biologically significant interests
reflects a heightened level of social sensitivity to highly important, yet
abstract, concerns. Whether the motivation is grounded upon genetic,
philosophical, ecological, patriotic or economic reasoning, endangered
species preservation has been supported by society through protective
legislation. It is possible that social perceptions of a desirable quality
of life have gradually expanded to include endangered species preser-
vation as a necessary component.
It has long been recognized that the expanding number and vari-
ety of federal actions have constituted a major cause of environmental
disruption and damage. The extensive litigation brought under the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act4 (NEPA) within the last decade attests
to that fact.5 In fact, one of the purposes of NEPA has been to make
organizations who are claiming violation of specialized environmental review statutes, in addition
to allegations of noncompliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4347 (1976). See W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 822-34 (1977).
3. In spite of recent national public opinion polls indicating continued public support for
environmental protection, see 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1617 (1978), (citing Resources For the Future
national opinion study), and EPA studies illustrating the large annual net economic benefit de-
rived from air pollution control, id at 2031 (1979) (air pollution control benefits), Carter adminis-
tration officials have attacked environmental control efforts as being inflationary. Alfred E. Kahn,
Chairman of the Council on Wage and Price Stability, testifying before the House Banking, Fi-
nance, and Urban Affairs Committee on November 22, 1978 stated that
[w]e can't have cleaner air and cleaner water and safer products and reduced industrial
accidents while at the same time having just as much of everything else as before ....
And if we continue to demand, all of us, just as much of all those other things as before
while now demanding additional amounts of environmental and occupational protec-
tion, then this does produce inflation.
Id at 1369 (quoting testimony before House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee).
Mr. Kahn stated on another occasion that economic marginal cost principles should even be ap-
plied to health-based pollution regulations. He noted, "The absence of a clear threshhold at
which health effects occur for most pollutants adds uncertainty and further argues for cost-benefit
analysis." [1979] ENV,,. REP. (BNA) 2131. The current economically oriented attacks have fo-
cused primarily upon industrial air and water pollution controls and have not been aimed at the
specialized environmental requirements considered in this Article.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4347 (1976).
5. See generally W. RODGERS, supra note 2, at 750-97.
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agencies aware of environmental interests so that they will consider
these interests in exercising their statutory authorities.' The legislative
action in the endangered species area, however, has transcended NEPA
to provide independent procedural and substantive standards for agen-
cies to meet. Simple compliance with the NEPA mandate will not sat-
isfy the separate requirements of these specialized statutes.8 Recent
legislation in this area, the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 9 employs a
system of administrative review of federal agency actions that has been
structured to achieve the goal of preserving endangered and threatened
species by integrating that specialized concern into the decisionmaking
processes of all federal agencies. It is the application of this developing
federal species preservation policy to the actions of the federal govern-
ment itself that will be explored in the following discussion.
This Article will examine (1) the nature of this special environ-
mental interest, (2) the changing congressional policies in this area, (3)
the administrative review mechanism and standards created pursuant
to the statutes and (4) the relative merits of both systems in achieving
their protective purposes. Through such an analysis we may better un-
derstand the way in which American society, through its legal system,
has chosen to value these special resources having a recognized yet un-
quantifiable importance to modern life.
II. UNIQUE ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS
In a sense, all environmental interests are unique-a high-quality
air or water level, for instance, provides special health and welfare ben-
efits that are not available at a lower quality-but are, nonetheless, dis-
tinguishable from the "unique" benefits accorded by preserving
endangered species. Air and water quality can be enhanced or deterio-
6. Section 102(1) of the National Environmental Policy Act states that "Mhe Congress au-
thorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws
of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth
in this [act] .... " 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976). In addition, the federal government is directed by
NEPA to "improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources ... [in
order to] (4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, and
maintain, whenever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of individual
choice." Id § 4331(b)(4).
7. See Rosenberg & Olson, Federal Environmental Review Requirements Other Than NEPA:
The Emerging Challenge, 27 CLEV. ST. L. Rnv. 195, 204-13 (1979).
8. The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), is a prime
example. In that case, the NEPA environmental impact statement for the proposed Tellico Dam
had been found adequate and was approved by the federal courts prior to the Endangered Species
Act challenge that ultimately stopped the project. See Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 492
F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974); Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
9. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
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rated by specific human actions. These resources are rechargeable in
most circumstances through the workings of the natural environmental
system. Consequently, social decisions can result in changes in these
environmental quality levels. By comparison, the destruction of a par-
ticular life form completely removes that special environmental asset
from the world. The asset in a very real sense is a nonrenewable re-
source. A social policy that is indifferent to the continued existence of
other forms of life reflects an anthropomorphic world view, which con-
siders animal and plant life to be expendable resources. Such an atti-
tude raises serious philosophical questions concerning the right of
mankind to exterminate an entire biological species. From a more
practical standpoint, a social policy that ignores the preservation of
wildlife permits the depletion of the genetic pool, which could prevent
future scientific and medical discoveries. America has chosen to turn
away from an insensitive policy toward endangered species. Recogniz-
ing the finality of decisionmaking in this area, Congress has created
special protections for endangered and threatened species. As long as
endangered species are recognized as being worthy of special consider-
ation under the law, the complex values discussed above must be in-
serted into the calculus for making potentially disruptive federal
decisions.
In a world of competing interests, the attainment of a particular
environmental value will depend upon the relative weight society ac-
cords to that interest. If it is of low relative importance, it will be
subordinated to other concerns. All too often, however, individual
programmatic or legislative decisions are made without any considera-
tion of the indirect effects of those decisions. Consequently, environ-
mentally damaging policy choices may result even if not consciously
intended. From an analytical standpoint, it is important to determine
the way in. which Congress has directly protected endangered species in
competition with other social interests. This is best reflected by the le-
gal system through which the allocative decisions are made. In what
ways are the balancing decisions actually carried out? Assuming that
endangered species constitute irreplaceable or unique interests, has fed-
eral law provided an adequate mechanism to further these interests?
This is the ultimate question to be addressed by this Article.
Prior to examining the legislative and administrative develop-
ments in this area of special environmental interest, certain patterns in
the emerging federal policy should be emphasized. First, federal law
has existed in this field since the turn of the century. Although the
[Vol. 58
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initial legislation was limited in scope and relatively unsophisticated by
our present standards, it did recognize the need for federal action to
protect these important interests at a time of great national develop-
ment. The early statutes focused upon the harmful effects of private
activities and not those of the federal government. Consequently, this
legislation took the form of criminal and civil penalties against the il-
licit commerce in certain animal species. The direction of these early
statutes also reflected an era of a smaller federal establishment with
much more limited functions and authorities.
As time passed, Congress enacted additional legislation that incre-
mentally enlarged the scope of the federal law. As the nature and ef-
fects of federal actions dramatically expanded during the last two
decades, it became apparent that the emerging policy encouraging en-
dangered species protection would have to be applied to the activities
of the federal government. The enactment of NEPA stood as a general
mandate requiring the federal agencies to be sensitive to a broad range
of environmental interests and "to the fullest extent possible" exercise
their authorities "in accordance with the policies set forth in
[NEPAI." 10
The specialized statutes addressing endangered species issues,
however, set independent rules for federal agencies, requiring consulta-
tion with expert bodies prior to taking a potentially damaging action.
This trend towards an administrative review of proposed federal activ-
ity was reflected in a number of environmental or conservation statutes
and was later reinforced by section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of
1973 (ESA)." The "expert agency" consultation requirement, as devel-
oped in the endangered species field, changes the structure of federal
agency decisionmaking by internalizing an advocate within the bureau-
cratic system. In theory, a legislatively mandated referral of proposed
federal actions early in the planning process should improve the quality
of agency decisions and in so doing reduce the need for public interest
litigation. Such a system also holds the potential for conflict between
the agency sponsoring a project and the reviewing agency. This tension
in the system at least creates an awareness on the part of project agen-
10. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 102, 83 Stat. 852
(1970) (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976)).
11. Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 7, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (current version at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536 (West
Cum. Supp. 1979), as amended by Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-159, 93 Stat. 1225) ("The
Secretary [of the Interior or of the Commerce] shall review other programs administered by him
and utilize such programs in futherance of the purposes of this chapter. All other Federal depart-
ments and agencies shall, in consultation with.. . the Secretary, utilize their authorities in futher-
ance of the purposes of this chapter.").
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cies that they must make special efforts to assess the impacts of their
actions upon endangered species and to minimize any anticipated ad-
verse effects. Under the "expert agency" approach, the intention is to
provide internal regulation of agency actions within the federal
bureaucracy by fostering early consultation and an informal negotia-
tion process with the reviewing agency. The success of such a proce-
dure largely depends upon the aggressiveness and power of the
reviewing agency. It can also have the effect of expanding access to the
decisionmaking process not only to the reviewing agency but also to
state, local and public interest groups.
The administrative review provisions of federal law in the area of
endangered species protection create special procedural and substan-
tive standards for federal agencies to follow in the conduct of their in-
dividual statutory mandates. Although judicial review of
environmentally damaging agency decisions remains available under
NEPA or other statutes, the ESA shifts the initial "outside" considera-
tion of agency proposals to a nonjudicial body. This structure also re-
flects an increasing emphasis and interest by environmental and
conservation groups in the administrative process as the source of de-
sirable decisions. In this era of challenge to the general principles of
environmental protection, the specialized systems of review of federal
activities and preferential standards for endangered species preserva-
tion may provide needed protection for this irreplaceable interest.
III. ENDANGERED SPECIES LEGISLATION
Although the major federal legislative actions in the areas of air
and water pollution have occurred only within the last decade, statutes
concerning wildlife and endangered species protection have existed
since the turn of the century.12 Whether initially motivated by the un-
derstanding that the emerging American industrial and population
growth patterns were resulting in a precipitous decline in the nation's
wildlife,13 or by some other goal, legislators in the state and federal
governments produced a series of haphazard and uncoordinated stat-
utes addressing limited problems. 4 Though the problem of species
12. See note 18 and accompanying text infra.
13. The devastation of the American buffalo and passenger pigeon population during the
nineteenth century serves as a grim reminder of the effects of an insensitive national policy toward
wildlife. See Dickens, The Law and Endangered Species of Wildfe, 9 GONz. L. REv. 57, 65 n.53
(1973).
14. See Coggins, Federal Wildlfe Law Achieves Adolescence.: Depelopments in the 1970",
1978 DuKE L.J. 753, 760.
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damage and extinction on the global and American scene became more
pronounced during this period,"5 the federal government played only a
limited role in species protection. The regulation of wildlife was con-
sidered a state function, not to be disturbed by the federal govern-
ment.' 6 The initial federal legislation was not viewed as protecting
endangered or rare species as a class, but rather was directed at specific
species problems. In addition, the scope of federal governmental ac-
tions during the earlier part of this century was considerably less exten-
sive than it is at present. Government action, therefore, was not the
target of the initial statutes enacted to protect wildlife. The inadequacy
of this limited approach, the recognition of the federal involvement in
species depletion and the increasing public support for species protec-
tion resulted in "a coordinated program to head off, or at least forestall,
what had appeared to be the inevitable destruction of numerous wild-
life species."'" As discussed below, this "coordinated program" now
includes specific obligations for federal agencies, although prior law
did not impose such duties.
The first federal statute in the area of species protection was the
Lacey Act of 1900,18 which in part prohibited the transportation in in-
terstate commerce of game animals and game or song birds taken in
15. For example, geologically based estimates made in 1969 determined that for the one mil-
lion years prior to man's presence on Earth species extinctions occurred at a rate of one every one
thousand years. By 1969, however, the rate of extinction for birds and mammals had increased to
between one and two every year. See S. REP. No. 526, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1969), reprintedin
[1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1413, 1414. The International Union for the Conservation
of Nature and Natural Resources then listed approximately 275 species of mammals and 300
species of birds as rare and endangered, and the U.S. Department of Interior identified 89 other
species as endangered within the United States. Id As recently as 1978, the Department of Inte-
rior estimated that 20 species were becoming extinct within the United States every decade and
that a larger number were being classified as "endangered." H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9453, 9455. By 1978, the De-
partment's listing of endangered and threatened species had grown to 228 domestic and 457 for-
eign species. Id at 6, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 9456.
16. In Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), the Supreme Court held that the commerce
clause did not prevent a state from prohibiting the transportation of wildlife outside its jurisdic-
tion because of a property-based theory of ownership. Id at 530-32. The Court, however, re-
cently overruled that case in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 335 (1979). In Hughes, the Court
chose to apply general commerce clause rules to evaluate and subsequently invalidate an
Oklahoma statute prohibiting the transportation and sale of minnows outside of the state. Id at
336-38. This decision leaves uncertain the permissible scope of state wildlife protection generally
and endangered species preservation in particular. Justice Brennan asserted:
We consider the States' interests in conservation and protection of wild animals as legiti-
mate local purposes similar to the States' interest in protecting the health and safety of
their citizens .... But the scope of legitimate state interests in "conservation" is nar-
rower under this analysis than it was under Geer.
Id at 337.
17. M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 370 (1977).
18. Act of May 25, 1900, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187.
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violation of state law."' This act thus provided federal sanctions only
for the infraction of other, nonfederal laws and hence did not constitute
a major federal involvement in wildlife or species protection. Because
the Lacey Act was not specifically intended to preserve rare animals,
20
and the states were initially slow to act in this area, the impact of this
first federal law on endangered species was minimal.2
Following the passage of the Lacey Act, federal policy continued
in an uncoordinated manner, protecting limited forms of wildlife for a
wide range of purposes. For instance, in 1926 Congress enacted the
Black Bass Act,22 making it unlawful to transport in interstate com-
merce large or smallmouth bass "caught, sold, purchased, or pos-
sessed"23 in violation of local law. This law was not a federal
recognition of the fish's endangerment, but rather a recognition of its
desirability as a sport fish in need of state management. Until recently,
no federal action had been taken to inventory and protect either animal
or plant species in a comprehensive fashion. This has been attributed
to the belief that Congress was without authority to legislate in this
19. Id §§ 3, 5 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 667(e) (1976); 18 id § 43).
The present section of the codified federal law covers a broad range of activities connected
with the commercial and noncommercial movement of any "wildlife taken, transported, or sold"
in a manner violating federal, state or foreign law or regulation. 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)-(b) (1976). The
statute provides for civil penalties of up to $5,000 for each violation and criminal penalties of up
to $10,000 per violation and/or imprisonment for up to one year. Id § 43(c)(l)-(d). The term
"wildlife" is defined to mean "any wild mammal, wild bird, amphibian, reptile, mollusk, or crus-
tacean, or any part, egg, or offspring thereof, or the dead body or parts thereof, but does not
include migratory birds for which protection is afforded under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, as
amended." Id § 43(f)(3).
20. The original Act was intended to allow the Secretary of Agriculture to undertake "the
preservation, distribution, introduction, and restoration of game birds and other wild birds." Act
of May 25, 1900, ch. 553, § 1, 31 Stat. 187 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 701 (1976)). The Act
also stated that its purpose was "to aid in the restoration of such birds in those parts of the United
Sates adapted thereto where the same have become scarce or extinct, and also to regulate the
introduction of American or foreign birds or animals in localities where they have not heretofore
existed." Id (emphasis added). The Secretary of Agriculture was given the power to exclude
certain species from the country, id § 2 (repealed 1909) (mongoose, fruit bat, English sparrow,
starling and other injurious species), possibly because they were not naturally occurring predators.
Although this programmatic function could be viewed as a predecessor to existing federal agency
responsibilities regarding endangered species, see 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536 (West Cum. Supp. 1979),
the regulatory function sought to protect agricultural and horticultural interests and not endan-
gered species.
21. In 1949, the statute was amended to allow the Secretary of the Treasury to regulate the
"transportation of wild animals and birds under humane and healthful conditions." Act of May
24, 1949, ch. 139, § 2, 63 Stat. 89 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 42(c) (1976)).
22. Act of May 20, 1926, ch. 346, 44 Stat. 576 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 851-856
(1976)). The statute imposed a penalty for conviction of a fine of up to $200 and/or imprisonment
for up to three months. Id § 3. The Black Bass Act was amended in 1930 to grant the Secretary
of Commerce administrative responsibility for the program. Act of July 2, 1930, ch. 801, §§ 1-9,
46 Stat. 845 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 851-856 (1976)).
23. Act of May 20, 1926, ch. 346, § 2, 44 Stat. 576 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 852 (1976)).
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area24 and had resisted the legislative temptation for that reason. The
legislative void, however, was more likely due to a less laudable ration-
ale. The reluctance of Congress to authorize a comprehensive federal
program for the preservation and enhancement of endangered species
is probably best explained by a lack of social awareness and interest in
the entire subject. The environmental movement in general is of recent
vintage, and species protection, being a specialized component of that
movement, has made its greatest advances within the last decade.
Modem legislative approaches to endangered species protection
can be traced to the Endangered Species Protection Act of 196625 and
the amendments that followed. The 1966 statute was the first federal
law directly addressing the question of threatened species extinction.
The Secretary of the Interior was directed to "provide a program for
the conservation, protection, restoration, and propagation of selected
species of native fish and wildlife. . that are threatened with extinc-
tion."21 6 Although modest in scope, the Act did initiate a program that
considered the issue of habitat destruction-a prime cause of species
extinction 7-and authorized the Secretary of the Interior to use Land
and Water Conservation Fund resources to acquire lands in order to
protect threatened species.28
24. See Dickens, supra note 13, at 66; Palmer, Endangered Species Protection: 4 History of
CongressionalAction, 4 ENV'L AFFAIRS 255, 257-58 (1975). A most thorough and thoughtful con-
sideration of this issue appears in Coggins & Hensley, Constitutional Limits on Federal Power to
Protect and Manage Wildlfe Is the Endangered Species Act Endangered?, 61 IOWA L. REv. 1099
(1976). The authors identify four possible bases for federal wildlife regulation: (1) the treaty
power, (2) the commerce clause, (3) the property clause, and (4) an alleged inherent power to
legislate on matters of national scope or concern. Id at 1122-43.
25. Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966) (repealed in part 1973). Sections 1 through 3 of
this statute were repealed in 1973 with the passage of the Endangered Species Act of 1973. Pub. L.
No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 903 (1973). Other sections of the 1966 law were retained.
26. Pub. L. No. 89-669, § l(a), 80 Stat. 926 (1966). The Act defined "threatened species" in
id § 1(c) (repealed 1973). This section also originated the formal listing process, which identified
species threatened with extinction.
27. Id The statute specifically referred to four causes of species extinction: loss of habitat,
overexploitation, disease, and predation. Id The Senate Report on the legislation noted:
Within the next few decades the economic growth of this country, its expanding
population and spreading urbanization, will require more working and living space,
more highways, more lands under intensive agriculture, more rivers and streams har-
nessed, more forests cut than the Nation has ever experienced.
Within this same span of time, unless immediate and vigorous action is taken, as
many as 30 to 40 types of birds and nearly an equal number of mammals will join the
ghosts of the heath hen and the passenger pigeon. Many animals are in dire straits be-
cause their skins are in demand. Alligators are killed wantonly to provide leather for
specialty and decorative wearing apparel.
S. REP. No. 1463, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1966) reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3342, 3343. These threatened species were limited to "native fish and wildlife" and, conse-
quently, foreign animal species and domestic flora were excluded from coverage by implication.
28. Pub. L. No. 89-669, § 2(b)-(c), 80 Stat. 926 (1966) (current version at 16 U.S.C. 1534(a)(1)
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In terms of federal agency consideration of endangered species,
the 1966 Act charged the Secretary of Interior with the duty to review
the agency's existing programs and to use those programs "to the extent
practicable,. . . in furtherance of the purpose of this act."29 Moreover,
the Secretary was required to consult with and assist other federal
agencies to integrate the policies of the Act "where practicable. ' 30 Al-
though the lineal ancestor of section 7 of the Endangered Species Act,
3'
section 2(d) of the 1966 Act lacked the mandatory character of the later
statute. The "practicability" requirement of section 2(d),32 in combina-
tion with the policy limitation that species protection was an agency
objective when "consistent with the primary purposes" 33 of the agency,
significantly weakened the impact of the 1966 Act.
As an initial legislative approach, the 1966 Act recognized the im-
periled state of some species of American fauna and charged the De-
partment of the Interior with the obligation of establishing an
endangered species program. Although the statute can be criticized for
a number of obvious shortcomings, 34 it did represent an expression of
(1976)). Section 2(c) oY'the statute authorized the appropriation of $15 million from the Land and
Water Conservation Fund with no annual appropriation exceeding $5 million. This represented
the first instance in which'federal law directed the Secretary of Interior to consider endangered
species in the agency's program. See Palmer, supra note 24, at 259.
29. Pub. L. No. 89-669, § 2(d), 80 Stat. 926 (1966) (repealed 1973).
30. Id
31. See note 53 and accompanying text infra.
32. Act of Oct. 15, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, § 2(d), 80 Stat. 926 (repealed 1973).
33. Section 1(b) of the 1966 Act read:
It is further declared to be the policy of Congress that the Secretary of the Interior,
the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Secretary of Defense, together with the heads of
bureaus, agencies, and services within their departments, shall seek to protect species of
native fish and wildlife, including migratory birds, that are threatened with extinction,
and, insofar as is practicable and consistent with the primary purposes of such bureaus,
agencies, and services, shall preserve the habitats of such threatened species of lands
under their jurisdiction.
Pub. L. No. 89-669, § 1(b), 80 Stat. 926 (1966) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1976)).
This section made species protection subservient to primary agency purposes. In addition,
the species protection policy was limited to three enumerated agencies that were ostensibly se-
lected because of their land management functions. In the Act's legislative history, however, the
Senate Commerce Committee report lamented that "[it would be most unfortunate and a waste of
money to carry out an endangered species program designed to conserve and protect the species
and their habitat and find that other Federal agencies are not taking similar steps in regard to the
species and habitat found on their lands." S. REP. No. 1463, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966), re-
printedin [19661 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3342, 3344 (emphasis added).
34. Probably the most significant deficiency was that the 1966 Act did not prohibit or limit
the "taking" of endangered species, except upon land within the National Wildlife Refuge System.
Pub. L. No. 89-669, § 4(c), 80 Stat. 926 (1966) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 668d (1976)).
Consequently, local laws were left to protect endangered species from overexploitation. In addi-
tion, the 1966 Act did not protect foreign animal life or any plant life; it did not prohibit the
transportation, sale or exchange of endangered species in interstate commerce; and it failed to
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congressional concern for threatened species. In 1966, the broad-based
environmental consciousness embodied in NEPA had yet to arise; fed-
eral agencies could maintain their staunch position of project or pro-
gram orientation, and the issue of endangered species protection was,
therefore, beyond serious consideration.
Three years after the initial federal legislation, Congress enacted
the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969.31 The 1969 Act
made minor modifications in the system of preserving native fish and
wildlife that had been established by the prior law. A new definition of
"fish or wildlife" extended protection to invertebrates as well as
vertebrates. 36 In addition, the Act enhanced the Department of Inte-
rior's habitat protection program by authorizing the acquisition of pri-
vately owned property "for the purpose of conserving, protecting,
restoring, or propagating any selected species of native fish and wildlife
that are threatened with extinction."37 Finally, the 1969 legislation
amended the Lacey Act to expand its prohibition against commerce in
illegally taken wildlife specifically to include the classification of
establish affirmative, unavoidable federal agency duties to actively protect endangered species.
See M. BEAN, supra note 17, at 373-74.
35. Pub. L. No. 91-135, § 1-5, 83 Stat. 275 (1969) (repealed 1973). The 1969 Act amended
and incorporated §§ 1-3 of the 1966 Act. Id § 12(a)-(e). The Senate Report on the 1969 Act
identified two rationales for strengthening endangered species protection. First, on a practical
level, species preservation is important to ensure sufficient reproduction to sustain a "controlled
exploitation" of the species. A corollary to this economic interpretation is that each extinct species
removes unique genetic material from the finite global supply, which might be useful in the future
to improve animal life through cross breeding. Second, the Report identified an ethical reason for
preserving species:
On a more philosophical plane, the gradual elimination of different forms of life
reduces the richness and variety of our environment and may restrict our understanding
and appreciation of natural processes. Moreover, in hastening the destruction of differ-
ent forms of life merely because they cannot compete in our common environment upon
man's terms, mankind, which has inadvertently arrogated to itself the determination of
which species shall live and which shall die, is assuming an immense ethical burden.
Henry Beston has indirectly suggested the magnitude of this burden in urging that man
adopt a new and wiser concept of animals.
S. REP. No. 526, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1413,
1415.
36. Section 1 of the Act defined "fish or wildlife" to mean "any wild mammal, fish, wild bird,
amphibian, reptile, mollusk, or crustacean, or any part, products, egg, or offspring thereof, or the
dead body or parts thereof." Pub. L. No. 91-135, § 1, 83 Stat. 275 (1969). This legislative change
was apparently motivated by a restrictive definition previously adopted by the Department of
Interior, which had limited the term's meaning to vertebrates only. See M. BEAN, supra note 17,
at 375 n.15.
37. Pub. L. No. 91-135, § 12(c), 83 Stat. 275 (1969) (repealed 1973). The Congress authorized
$1 million per year for each of the fiscal years 1970, 1971 and 1972. Id This acquisition authority
was to be exercised only for privately held lands within the boundaries of areas already adminis-
tered by the Secretary of Interior. These acquisition programs were especially helpful in preserv-
ing species with little or no commercial or economic value. See S. REP. No. 526, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 1-3, refprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1413, 1414-15.
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"amphibian, reptile, mollusk, or crustacean." 38
Although the 1969 Act had a minimal effect on American endan-
gered species, it did have a substantial impact on the international
trade in these animals. The Secretary of Interior was directed to estab-
lish a list of species and subspecies of fish or wildlife "threatened with
world wide extinction, '39 and the importation of these listed species
was prohibited without first securing a permit from the Secretary.4
This listing procedure required the Secretary of Interior to consult with
the Secretary of State and the foreign country or countries in which the
endangered species was found and to base the decision to list a species
on "the best scientific and commercial data available."' 4 1 Willful viola-
tion of this section would be punishable by a fine of up to $10,000 or
one year in prison or both.42 Nonwillful violators were to be punished
with a civil penalty of up to $5,000 and the forfeiture of the illegally
imported items.43 Finally, the Act directed the Secretaries of State and
38. Pub. L. No. 91-135, § 7(a), 83 Stat. 275 (1969) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 43(f(3) (1976)).
The Senate report indicated that the new definition for "wildlife" was the "most important" of all
the definitions provided in the section because of the expansion in coverage. See S. REP. No. 526,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 14, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1413, 1427.
39. Pub. L. No. 91-135, § 3(a), 83 Stat. 275 (1969) (repealed 1973). Although this listing
decision was to be made after consultation with "other interested Federalagencies, "id (emphasis
added), § 3(a) did not reqtire the participation of federal agencies in the listing process.
40. Id § 2 (repealed 1973). Permits could be issued for zoological, educational, scientific, or
propagational purposes. Id § 3(c) (repealed 1973). This provision recognized the important func-
tion of zoos and other similar organizations in the protection of endangered species. Not all such
permit applications, however, were approved by the Secretary of Interior. In fact, approximately
one-half were denied. See Palmer, supra note 24, at 263. The statute also provided for the issu-
ance of permits to "minimize undue economic hardship." See Pub. L. No. 91-135, § 3(b), 83 Stat.
275 (1969) (repealed 1973). This "economic hardship" permit was to be made available to persons
who had contracted for the importation of an endangered species prior to its formal listing but had
not yet taken delivery. The apparent congressional motivation here was to mitigate the economic
loss created by the formal listing of a species and possible to avoid an allegation that the regula-
tory action constituted a compensible "taking" under the fifth amendment.
41. Id § 3(a) (repealed 1973). The listing procedure was to comply with the rulemaking
dictates of § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act. See id § 3(d). The designation of endan-
gered species would, therefore, be considered a "rule" and the procedural requirements of § 3(d)
thus were enacted with the intention that interested parties be involved in the decision to add or
delete species to the list, both informally prior to and formally after, publication of the proposed
rule in the Federal Register. See S. RaP. No. 526, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 6, reprinted in [1969] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1413, 1418-19. The Senate report indicated that, in order to protect
species in immediate jeopardy, no judicial review of the Secretary's final listing decision would be
available. Ad at 6, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1419. This "telescoped"
procedure was justified by the review of all listed species once every five years required by § 3(a).
The purported removal of these listing decisions from judicial review is questionable in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967), and
Association of Data Processing Service Organization, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156 (1970). See
also 4 K. DAVIS, AnmisTRATrvE LAw § 28.07 (1972).
42. Pub. L. No. 91-135, § 4(b), 83 Stat. 275 (1969) (repealed 1973).
43. Id § 4(a)(1) (repealed 1973).
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Interior to "seek the convening of an international ministerial meeting
... prior to June 30, 1971" in order to conclude an international con-
vention on the conservation of endangered species.' This convention
was held in February of 1973 and resulted in the Convention on Inter-
national Trade in Endangered Wild Fauna and Flora, which was
signed in Washington, D.C. on March 3, 1973.11 This international
agreement undoubtedly served as an inspiration for the 1973 Endan-
gered Species Act.
Regardless of the success the 1969 Act had With the problem of
international trade in endangered species, it did not satisfactorily solve
the problem of damage to domestic species. The limited restriction
upon destructive federal activities was clearly inadequate in the face of
expanding federal involvement in developmental projects. Federal
policy on species protection relied heavily on state regulation of wild-
life resources46 and only focused on species that had reached a state of
endangerment. Federal action in the endangered species area, how-
ever, developed into a more complete protective scheme during the
next decade.
The 1973 Act47 went far beyond the bounds of the prior two stat-
utes enacted in 1966 and 1969. The prior laws focused only upon spe-
cies in imminent danger of extinction. The new legislation, however,
applied to all plants and animals considered to be both "endangered"
and "threatened."4 Under its specific language, virtually any species
could be protected by the 1973 Act.4 9 Viewing the problem of vanish-
ing species as a serious one, and spurred on by the international con-
vention, Congress passed a broad-based statute that increased the level
of federal involvement in the entire area. Chief Justice Burger de-
scribed the 1973 Act as "the most comprehensive legislation for the
44. Id § 5(b) (repealed 1973).
45. See 68 DEP'T STATE BULL. 619 (May 14, 1973). For a discussion of the convention, see
Palmer, supra note 24, at 263-66.
46. See note 6 supra.
47. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1543 (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1979), as amended by Act of Dec. 28, 1979,
Pub. L. No. 95-159, 93 Stat. 1225).
48. The statute defines an "endangered" species as one which is in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of its range." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(4) (1976) (recodified at 16
U.S.C.A. § 1532(6) (West Cum. Supp. 1979)). A "threatened" species in one which is "likely to
become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion
of its range." Id § 1532(15) (recodified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(20) (West Cum. Supp. 1979)). The
1973 Act clearly envisioned the listing process- to be a dynamic one with species entering and
leaving the list at various times.
49. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5), (9) (1976) (recodified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(8), (14) (West Cum.
Supp. 1979)); id § 1532(11) (current version at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(16) (West Cum. Supp. 1979)).
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preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation."50
The overall purposes of the 1973 Act were to conserve ecosystems
upon which endangered species depend, to protect the species them-
selves and to implement international agreements in the area.', In ad-
dition, the policy implemented by the legislation was specifically
directed at the federal government, whose departments and agencies
were required to "conserve endangered species and threatened species
.. . [and to] utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purpose of
[the Act]." 2 To underscore the federal role in the species preservation
effort, Congress added an interagency cooperation section-section 7-
which reiterated agency responsibilities and established a substantive
standard for agency actions that affect endangered or threatened spe-
cies.5 3 This "cooperation" requirement of the Act served as the major
focus for litigation of endangered species issues in the much-publicized,
recent case before the United States Supreme Court-TVA v. Hils-4
Beyond the creation of these general requirements, the 1973 Act
mandated a federal listing process for endangered and threatened spe-
cies of animals and plants,55 which was to be administered primarily by
50. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978). Although the 1973 Act was generally acclaimed as
a broadening and strengthening of national species protection legislation, there was some criticism
of the bill's drafting, its lack of deadlines and its lack of federal supervision of state enforcement
actions. See Coggins, Conserving Wildiffe Resources: An Overview of the Endangered Species Act
of 1973, 51 N.D.L. REv. 315, 337 (1974).
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1511(b) (1976).
52. Id § 1531(c). The term "conserve" was specifically and extensively defined in the statute
to mean
the use of all methods andprocedres which are necessary to bring any endangered species
or threatened species to thepoint at which the measurespro videdpursuant to this chapter
are no longer necessary. Such methods and procedures include, but are not limited to, all
activities associated with scientific resources management such as research, census, law
enforcement, habitat acquisition and maintenance, propagation, live trapping, and trans-
plantation, and, in the extraordinary case where population pressures within a given
ecosystem cannot be otherwise relieved, may include regulated taking.
Id. § 1532(2) (1976) (recodified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1979)) (emphasis
added).
53. Prior to amendment in 1978, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976) provided that all federal agencies
were required to take "such action necessary to insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried
out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence of such endangered species and threatened
species or result in the destruction or modification of (the critical) habitat of such species." The
standard established by this section became critical to the United States Supreme Court's decision
in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). This strict standard has recently been moderated by the 1979
amendments, which merely require that agencies must ensure that any action "is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence" of an endangered species or its habitat. Act of Dec. 28, 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 40(l)(c), 93 Stat. 1225 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(7)(a)(2)).
54. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
55. The 1973 Act specifically included plants within the definition of "species". 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(11) (1976) (current version at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(16) (West Cum. Supp. 1979)). Prior acts
did not cover plants. In addition, the word "plant" was defined to mean "any member of the plant
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the Department of Interior. 6 The listing process serves to identify
those particular life forms to be selected by the federal government for
the protection provided by the Act.57  The Act provides five specific
criteria to be used by the Secretary of Interior for determining whether
a species should be formally listed. 8
The major effects of a species listing by the Department of Interior
under the 1973 Act were threefold. First, all federal agencies had to
"insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not
jeopardize the continued existence" of the species or adversely affect
the critical habitat of the species.59 The broad interpretation given this
kingdom, including seeds, roots and other parts thereof." Id. § 1532(9) (1976). The 1978 amend-
ments to the Act left the definition of "plants" intact, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(14) (West Cum. Supp.
1979), but made some subtle, yet important changes in the definition of "species," see 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 1532(16) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). The 1973 Act directed the Smithsonian Institution to review
"species of plants which are now or may become endangered or threatened" and report the results
to Congress. 16 U.S.C. § 1541 (1976). The Conference Committee assigned this reporting respon-
sibility to the Smithsonian Insitution because it had "no bias in the eventual outcome of the
study." H.R. REP. No. 740, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 28, reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3001, 3007. This reference to the impartial character of the Smithsonian indicates the prac-
tical importance of a decision to list a species as endangered or threatened. The Smithsonian
report, which lists approximately 3100 species of endangered or threatened plants, is printed in
H.R. Doc. No. 51, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The Secretary of Interior has listed twenty species
of flora as endangered and two as threatened. See 41 Fed. Reg. 58,408 (1976). The Secretary has
accorded the Smithsonian report no special priority and has treated it as a petition for listing. See
41 Fed. Reg. 24,524 (1976).
56. The administrative responsibilities under the Act fall primarily upon the Secretary of
Interior. Certain marine species, however, are under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Com-
merce pursuant to the executive Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,627 (1970).
In addition, the Secretary of Agriculture is accorded responsibilities under the Act and under the
International Convention on Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora with respect
to the import and export of plants. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(15) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
57. See M. BEAN, supra note 17, at 390-95.
58. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(l)(l)-(5) (1976). The criteria set out by the statute for use by the
Secretary in determining whether a species should be formally listed are:
(1) the present or threatened destruction, modification or curtailment of its habitat or
range;
(2) overutilization for commercial, sporting, scientific, or educational purposes;
(3) disease or predation;
(4) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or
(5) other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued existence.
These criteria appear to give the Secretary of Interior wide discretion in listing or delisting
species. As of November 30, 1978, 177 species of fauna in the United States have been formally
listed as endangered and 37 species of fauna have been listed as threatened. COUNCIL ON ENVI-
RONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL STATISTICS 1978, at 171 (1979).
59. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976) (amended 1978, 1979). This provision, § 7 ofthe 1973 Act, must
have been one of the most initially underestimated provisions of federal environmental law. The
Senate Report on the Act merely summarized the language of § 7. See S. REP. No. 307, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9, reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2989, 2997. Furthermore,
the Conference Report failed to mention the section apparently because it had not been the sub-
ject of any disagreement among the conferees. H.R. REP. No. 740, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 25-6,
reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3001, 3002-08. Even at a time when most
NORTH CAROLIN4 LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
language by the Supreme Court in TV.4 v. Hill6" made the listing deci-
sion one of great importance to federal agencies because of its impact
upon planned projects. The 1978 amendments to the Act were, to a
large extent, addressed to mitigating the effect of the Hill decision by
establishing multi-layered administrative review of project/species con-
flicts and by providing standards to guide these decisions." The sec-
ond significant effect of listing an endangered species was the possible
employment of the Act's civil and criminal penalties should there be an
importation, taking, commercial exchange, or regulatory violation. 2
Of particular importance was the language establishing as a matter of
federal law that the "taking" of endangered fauna was illegal.6 In this
way the federal policy favoring the preservation of vanishing species
found a direct application against the actions of private individuals and
organizations,' deterring intentionally destructive conduct. Third, the
listing of an endangered or threatened species required the identifica-
tion of its critical habitat .6  The purpose of the 1973 Act was not only
to protect the specific endangered species of plant or animal life but
also to preserve the physical environment necessary for continued sur-
vival of the species. This comprehensive approval of species protection
was laudable. Unfortunately, the statute did not define the term "criti-
observers had no idea of the potential significant of the section, however, at least one commentator
recognized the power inherent in the mandatory language of § 7. See Coggins, supra note 50, at
329 n.118.
60. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
61. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536 (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amended 1979).
62. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)-(2) (1976).
63. The term "take" under the 1973 Act is defined to mean "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16
U.S.C. § 1532(14) (1976) (recodified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(19) (West Cum. Supp. 1979)). This
broad definition of the term "take" would seemingly cover both direct and indirect damage to
endangered species and their habitat. It has never been successfully argued, however, that this
definition encompasses indirect governmental activities having an adverse effect upon endangered
species.
64. 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (1976) (amended 1978). The Act defines the term "person" to include
not only private entities but also "any officer, employee, agent, department, or instrumentality of
the Federal Government, of any State or political subdivision thereof, or any foreign govern-
ment." Id. § 1532(8) (1976) (recodified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(13) (West Cum. Supp. 1979)).
65. The definition of an "endangered species" under the 1973 Act included "any species
which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(4) (1976) (recodifled at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(6) (West Cum. Supp. 1979)). This language
indicated that the drafters of the 1973 Act considered the possibility that a species could be endan-
gered in only part of its natural habitat. Furthermore, when preparing the formal listing the
Secretary of Interior was directed to "specify with respect to each such species over what portion
of its range it is endangered or threatened." Id § 1533(c)(1) (amended 1978). It is possible that a
species could be endangered only in a limited geographical area and still be formally "listed."
The prohibitions in the Act, however, generally apply to "taking" of listed endailgered species
with no distinction made for specific locations.
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cal habitat" or even detail the standards to guide the Secretary of Inte-
rior in defining the term.66 Under section 7 of the 1973 Act, the
establishment of the "critical habitat" for a listed species was an ex-
tremely important decision. All federal agencies were obligated to en-
sure that their actions did not "result in the destruction or modification
of [a critical habitat]." 67 By adding this language to the statute, Con-
gress established a generally applicable federal duty to avoid actions
having adverse effects upon not only endangered species but also their
immediate environment. Consequently, from the federal agency view-
point, the setting of precise critical habitat boundaries was often as sig-
nificant as the initial decision to formally list the species.6
After passage of the Endangered Species Act, the federal govern-
ment reluctantly responded to the mandate of section 7 of the Act.69
During this period many federal agencies were learning through active
litigation and the development of administrative policy how best to sat-
isfy the requirements of NEPA-the general purpose environmental
act. A great deal of attention was paid to NEPA compliance with the
idea that other specialized environmental laws could be satisfied by a
66. The Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Services, sharing jurisdic-
tion under the 1973 Act, jointly issued regulations in 1973 defining what they considered to be
critical habitat. This definition, being a generally applicable description, is not specific, but rather
describes a broadly-defined environment needed for both the survival and the subsequent recov-
ery of the species.
"Critical habitat" means by air, land, or water area (exclusive of those existing man-
made structures or settlements which are not necessary to the survival and recovery of a
listed species) and constituent elements thereof, the loss of which would appreciably de-
crease the likelihood of the survival and recovery of a listed species or a distinct segment
of its population. The constituent elements of critical habitat include, but are not limited
to: physical structures and topography, biota, climate, human activity, and the quality
and chemical content of land, water, and air. Critical habitat may represent any portion
of the present habitat of a listed species and may include additional areas for reasonable
population expansion.
50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1978). See text accompanying note 196 infra.
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976) (amended 1978, 1979).
68. An examination of the existing critical habitat designations will illustrate the impact of
these administrative determinations upon federal agency action. Critical habitats frequently cover
a large portion of two or more states. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.96 (1978) (critical habitat for plants).
The myriad of federal activities occurring in these states would come under the § 7 requirements.
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), demonstrated the perils of ignoring the mandate of the 1973 Act.
69. The lead agency under the administrative scheme established by the 1973 Act---the De-
partment of the Interior-was slow to exercise any of the authority granted to it by the statute.
Professor Coggins wrote in late 1974:
The inescapable consequence [of having a great degree of administrative discretion
but no statutory deadlines for action] has been that, in the first nine months that the new
Act has been effective, no additions to the existing endangered species lists have been
made; no threatened species list has been published; no protective (or any other) regula-
tions have been promulgated; no standards relating to state-federal agreement have been
issued; no petitions have been processed, and so forth.
Coggins, supra note 50, at 337.
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judically acceptable environmental impact statement (EIS). As a re-
suit, section 7 was viewed by the federal agencies as advisory and as not
requiring any separate compliance, either substantively or procedur-
ally.7" Until the United States, Supreme Court ruled on the statute in
TV4 v. Hill, there was little judicial interpretation of section 7 and its
effect upon federal agency action. The handful of cases decided in the
five-year period between the passage of the 1973 Act and its significant
amendment in 1978 demonstrate the unfamiliarity of both the federal
courts and the public interest litigation groups with the scope of the
legislation.7' The cases also reflect the gradual recognition of the
strong pro-endangered species congressional policy embodied in sec-
tion 7, which requires advance agency consultation with the Fish and
Wildlife Service and a substantive standard by which to measure pro-
posed actions. A brief review of the federal case law will illustrate the
trend as it developed prior to passage of the 1978 amendments.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER SECTION 7
Although section 7 became effective in 1973, surprisingly few cases
arose under its authority prior to 1978. In one such case, Sierra Club v.
Frehlke,72 the court was asked to enjoin an Army Corps of Engineers
dam project located in Meramac Park, Missouri, in part because con-
struction of the dam would jeopardize the continued existence of the
endangered Indiana bat. It was also claimed that the reservoir built for
the dam would flood the critical habitat of this variety of bat. The
Sierra Club maintained that the Corps ignored warnings from the De-
partment of the Interior about the impact of the dam on the Indiana
70. This interpretation appears erroneous in light of the strong language employed in § 7.
One commentator, citing the statements of Representative John Dingell, the House manager of
the endangered species bill, found that the interagency cooperation provision created "an inflexi-
ble obligation to protect endangered species." Note, Obh'gallons of Federal4gencies Under Section
7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1247, 1254, 1255 (1976).
71. Allegations of Endangered Species Act violations, especially after the notoriety attributa-
ble to the TV4 v. Hill controversy, are appearing more frequently in litigation and are challenging
a wide variety of federal actions. Often the Act is merely mentioned as one possible ground for a
plaintiff's complaint and the reviewing court does not reach the merits of the claim. See, e.g.,
Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1979) (Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas leases
on the Georges Bank); Libby Rod & Gun Club v. Poteat, 594 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1979) (dam
construction on the Kootenai River in Montana); Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. Berg-
land, 573 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1979) (clear-cutting of national
forests in Texas); Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Eskimo whaling rights); Hopson
v. Kreps, 462 F. Supp. 1374 (D. Alaska 1979) (Eskimo whaling rights); South Carolina Wildlife
Fed. v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118 (D. S.C. 1978) (water pollution caused by construction and
operation of dams in South Carolina and Georgia).
72. 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976).
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bat population. In rejecting the Sierra Club's position, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit viewed the mandate of
section 7 to be mainly procedural and concluded that, once a project
agency had consulted with the Department of Interior, it had satisfied
its obligation under the ESA. In terms of the substantive effect of the
Fish and Wildlife Service's expert opinion73 concerning the project's
impact on endangered species, the court stated, "Consultation under
Section 7 does not require acquiescence. . . [The responsibility for
the [project] decision after consultation is not vested in the Secretary [of
Interior,] but in the agency involved."74 The Eighth Circuit viewed the
FWS's function as being strictly advisory, with no veto power over the
actions of other federal agencies. At no point did the court examine the
specific obligations imposed by the Act that were intended to ensure
that endangered species would not be jeopardized by agency action.
Though section 7 was accorded a rather weak interpretation in
Froehlke, the result in the case can be explained on other grounds.
First, the continued existence of a species was not threatened by the
federal action; the court noted that there are approximately 700,000 In-
diana bats in existence and that this Corps of Engineers project would
affect the habitat of only about 10,000.75 Also, the appeals court and
the district court below had approved the environmental impact state-
ment prepared for the project,76 and, consequently, the court may have
believed that the adequate EIS relieved the Corps of its obligation to
consider any other environmental effect.
During 1976, the same year that Sierra Club v. Froehike was de-
cided, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also
ruled on a section 7 case-National Wildiffe Federation v. Coleman.
77
The Coleman case concerned the construction of a federally assisted
highway through a portion of the sole habitat of the endangered bird
species called the Mississippi sandhill crane. At the time of the litiga-
tion, only four of these cranes were known to exist. The district court
had dismissed the National Wildlife Federation's complaint, which was
based upon allegations of section 7 violations.78 On appeal, however,
73. The Secretary of the Interior has delegated his consultation power to both the FWS and
NMFS. Interagency Cooperation-Endangered Species Act of 1973, 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.02, .04
(1978).
74. 534 F.2d at 1303.
75. Id
76. Id at 1301. The district court had held that plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of
proof on all issues. 392 F. Supp. 130, 144 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
77. 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
78. 400 F. Supp. 705 (S.D. Miss. 1975).
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the Fifth Circuit gave section 7 requirements considerably more weight
than did the Eighth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Froehlke. Speaking for
the court, Judge Simpson determined that there was a mandatory duty
imposed upon federal agencies to consult with the Department of Inte-
rior and to ensure that agency activities did not jeopardize endangered
species.79 Although the court recognized no project-stopping veto
power granted the Interior Department by the ESA,80 it did take a sig-
nificant step in expanding the scope of section 7 consultation. Judge
Simpson stated that the Department of Transportation had failed to
consider properly not only the direct but also the indirect effects of the
highway's construction on the sandhill crane.8'
A comprehensive review of a project would require the sponsoring
agency to evaluate secondary impacts in much the same way as does an
EIS. Implicit in the court's holding in Coleman, therefore, is the sub-
stantive principle that section 7 of the ESA mandates a broad-based
analysis of the impact of a federal project on endangered species. Be-
cause a project lacking this wide-ranging analysis probably will not
withstand judicial scrutiny, the practical effect of the Fifth Circuit's de-
cision is to require the submission of a federal project to the Depart-
ment of the Interior for such an analysis. In Coleman, for example, the
highway's construction was enjoined until the Department of the Inte-
rior determined that project modifications brought the activity into
compliance with section 7 requirements.8 2 By reaching this result, the
court effectively gave the Department of Interior limited authority to
regulate highways built with federal aid.
Not all the endangered species cases have involved the use of the
Endangered Species Act to halt federal developmental projects. In De-
fenders of Wildlife v. Andrus,83 a district court had an opportunity to
review the FWS regulations on the sport hunting of migratory game
birds. Plaintiffs alleged that, since the regulations permitted hunting
before sunrise and after sunset, endangered bird species would be inad-
vertently killed because hunters could not distinguish between them
and other birds during those periods.8 4 In striking down the regula-
79. 529 F.2d at 371.
80. Judge Simpson's view did not grant a veto power to the Department of Interior but did
subject the project agency's decision that its project did not adversely affect the species to judicial
review under a "clear error of judgment" test. Id at 371-72.
81. Id at 373.
82. Id at 375.
83. 428 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977).
84. Id at 168-69.
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tions as being arbitrary and unlawful, the court rejected the contention
of the FWS that its duty under the ESA was solely to avoid jeopardiz-
ing the continued existence of protected species. The court ruled in-
stead that the FWS had an affirmative duty to increase the population
of protected species and to use all necessary methods to "bring these
species back from the brink so that they may be removed from the
protected class."' 5 Consequently, the sport hunting regulations could
not stand.86
Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus may present an unusual case since
the programs and regulations of an agency acting under the authority
of the Secretary of Interior were involved and not those of a project-
oriented, developmental agency. Under section 7 of the ESA, the Sec-
retary is directed to review the programs under his authority and "util-
ize such programs in furtherance of the purposes of this [Act]." 87 This
same standard arguably should be the mandate of every federal
agency, and, hence, the affirmative duties identified by the district court
would be generally applicable. The expansive substantive interpreta-
tion given the statute by the court in Defenders of Wildlfe may be con-
sidered part of an emerging trend in the law.
The application of the Endangered Species Act and the conse-
quences of that application were again considered in Connor v. An-
drus.88 Plaintiff in Connor successfully challenged FWS and Texas
migratory waterfowl regulations on substantive administrative law
grounds. The agency rules prohibiting the hunting of the endangered
Mexican duck in designated portions of New Mexico, Texas and Ari-
zona were struck down as being unsupported by a rational basis and
representing a clear error of judgment.8 9 The district court determined
that the federal and state hunting ban would not serve to increase the
population of the endangered species. This surprising conclusion
stemmed from the court's determination that the hunting ban would
indirectly aid in the destruction of the critical habitat of the endangered
duck species.90 The court concluded that designated "no hunting"
lands would be put to a more intensive land use because they could no
longer be reserved for duck hunting. The ultimate result of this land
85. Id at 170.
86. Id
87. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (West Cum. Supp. 1979), as amended by Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L.
No. 96-159, § 4, 93 Stat. 1225.
88. 453 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
89. Id at 1041-42.
90. Id at 1041 n.2.
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use shift, the court felt, would be to eliminate necessary habitat for the
Mexican duck and thus further reduce the size of species populations.
Therefore, in order to protect the habitat of the duck, the Connor court
enjoined the Fish and Wildlife Service's regulations, thereby permitting
the endangered species to be hunted in three states. 91
With this limited amount of prior judicial review, the United
States Supreme Court approached the best known case involving the
Endangered Species Act-T01 v. Hill.92 This case, involving the now
famous snail darter, turned endangered species protection into a matter
of considerable public controversy. TVA v. Hill merits a detailed dis-
cussion here because of the substantive legal principles involved in the
case and because the decision led to the most recent amendments to the
ESA.
Beginning in 1966, Congress authorized annual funds for the con-
struction of the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River. In 1967,
construction was commenced on the $100 million structure, which will
flood 16,500 acres when completed.93 After litigation over the ade-
quacy of the environmental impact statement concluded, 94 a Universty
of Tennessee ichthyologist, Dr. David A. Etnier, discovered the exist-
ence of a small fish that he named the snail darter. He determined that
the segment of the Little Tennessee River that was to be impounded
was the sole habitat of the species.95 Pursuant to the Endangered Spe-
cies Act, which was enacted on December 28, 1973, the snail darter was
listed by the Department of the Interior as an endangered species on
91. Id at 1041-42. At the time of issuance, this decision was unsettling for a number of
reasons. First, it placed the burden of showing a rational basis for the regulation upon the federal
agency acting to protect an endangered species. Id at 1040. Here, the district court did not defer
to, or acknowledge, any agency expertise in the endangered species field. Id The court, using
only information gathered at a hearing on plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction, invali-
dated a regulation that had been formally proposed, redrafted and finally issued as, a formal
agency regulation. Id at 1039. To condemn this regulation as having "no rational basis," id at
1041-42, would seemingly require a more broadly based factual determination. Second, the court
enjoined enforcement of the agency regulation without discussing the traditional tests for injunc-
tive relief. It is difficult to imagine just how plaintiffculd have satisfied the requisite showings of
irreparable harm, likelihood of success on the merits, and public interest, see 43 C.J.S. Injunctions
§ 17 (1978), in order to justify the award of the injunction. And third, this decision could have
encouraged other individuals and organizations to challenge protective regulations in local federal
districts. Taking the Connor v. Andrus decision at face value, however, it ironically supports the
evolving philosophy that in ESA cases federal agencies must exercise their responsibilities in a
manner that minimizes the total adverse effects upon endangered species, both direct and indirect,
92. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
93. 549 F.2d 1064, 1067 (6th Cir. 1977), a'd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
94. See Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 492'F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974); Environmental
Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
95. 549 F.2d at 1067-68.
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October 9, 1975,96 and, in April of 1976, the river segment in which the
fish is found was formally designated a critical habitat.
97
Suit was filed in February of 1976 to enjoin completion of the
project.98 Even though the trial court agreed with the Department of
the Interior that completion of the dam would probably result in the
complete destruction of the snail darter species,9 9 it refused to grant the
permanent injunction sought by plaintiffs.100 The court was persuaded
that the continuation of funding for the project indicated a congres-
sional determination that the ESA did not bar completion. Undoubt-
edly, the court's belief that the project could not be modified to mitigate
the effect upon the snail darter certainly contributed to its decision. As
if to confirm the district court's decision, Congress soon appropriated
$9 million for continuing work on the Tellico project. 10'
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit took a position diametrically opposed to that of the lower court. In
a strongly worded opinion by Judge Celebrezze, the court found that
the TVA dam project had violated section 7 of the Act, and, conse-
quently, further construction was permanently enjoined.'0 2 In revers-
ing the district court, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the ESA did
not provide the Secretary of the Interior with veto power over the activ-
ities of other federal agencies. The court, however, did note that "com-
pliance standards" set by the Interior Department, could be considered
upon judicial review.1
0 3
Of greater significance was the court's resolution of the "on-going
project" issue. The threshold question was whether the ESA applied to
any project initiated prior to the enactment of the statute. In unequivo-
cal terms the court stated that the Act did apply to ongoing projects,
reasoning that detrimental impacts upon endangered species may not
be apparent prior to construction. 104 The degree to which the project
was completed was not influential in the Sixth Circuit's opinion; the
96. 40 Fed. Reg. 47,505-06 (1975) (codified in 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1978)).
97. 41 Fed. Reg. 13,926-28 (1976) (codified in 50 C.F.R. § 17.95 (1978)).
98. 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977), aj'd, 437 U.S.
153 (1978).
99. Id at 757.
100. Id at 764.
101. Public Works for Water and Power Development and Energy Research Appropriations
Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-355, 90 Stat. 889 (1976).
102. 549 F.2d at 1070, 1075.
103. Id at 1070. In this respect, the Sixth Circuit appears to have adopted the view of the
Fifth Circuit expressed in National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman. See note 80 supra.
104. Id at 1071.
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court viewed the possible destruction of a species as the decisive factor.
Judge Celebrezze wrote: "[W]hether a dam is 50% or 90% completed is
irrelevant in calculating the social and scientific costs attributable to the
disappearance of a unique form of life."' 05 Consequently, the court
issued a permanent injunction. 0 6 Undaunted, the appropriations com-
mittees of both Houses of Congress sponsored legislation that contin-
ued funding for the Tellico project.1
0 7
Finally, in 1978, the United States Supreme Court issued its deci-
sion on the snail darter controversy and resoundingly supported the
Sixth Circuit's interpretation of the ESA. 0° The Court found the lan-
guage of section 7 unambiguous and concluded that the operation of
the Tellico dam violated both the spirit and the wording of the Act.
The Court first noted that the fundamental factual issue in the case was
undisputed-the TVA had admitted that the Tellico Dam would de-
stroy the snail darter species and its critical habitat. 1 9 The Court then
turned to the crucial legal issue of whether this fact rendered the TVA
in violation of the ESA. The TVA argued that Congress did not intend
to subject this major, on-going project to the rigors of the ESA. This
argument was rejected out of hand by the Court." 0 After reviewing the
legislative history of the ESA, the Court concluded that the 1973 Act
"represented the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of
endangered species ever enacted by any nation."'' Moreover, the
Court determined that, under the provisions of the Act, species extinc-
tion was to be avoided "whatever the cost" and endangered species
were to be accorded "priority over the 'primary missions' of federal
agencies.""' 2 Viewing this policy decision as clearly within the prov-
105. Id
106. Id at 1075. Judge Celebrezze added, "This injunction shall remain in effect until Con-
gress, by appropriate legislation, exempts Tellico from compliance with the Act or the snail darter
has been deleted from the list of endangered species or its critical habitat materially redefined."
Id
107. Public Works for Water and Power Development and Energy Research Appropriations
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-96, 91 Stat. 797 (1978).
108. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
109. Id at 170-72.
110. Id at 173-74.
111. Id at 180.
112. Id at 184-85. The majority also disposed of the TVA's second line of defense that the
ESA should not be applied retroactively to affect an on-going federal project. The Court ruled
that the § 7 requirements must be met when any project activities remain to be "authorized,
funded, or carried out." Id at 189. Furthermore, the TVA argument that continuing appropria-
tions for the Tellico project represented a limited implied repeal of the ESA was solidly rejected.
The most that the Court was willing to accept was that the congressional committees did not think
that the ESA was applicable to the Tellico dam project. Standing alone, the Court felt that this
did not constitute a statutory repeal. Id at 189-93. This portion of the Supreme Court's decision
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ince of the Congress, the Court found no legislative or statutory author-
ity vested in the judiciary to override the congressional decision.
1 13
The most significant principle to be extracted from the TVA v. Hill
decision is that the 1973 Endangered Species Act imposed upon all fed-
eral agencies both a consultation requirement and a substantive deci-
sionmaking standard upon which courts can evaluate agency
compliance.' 14 In addition, when the facts clearly indicate that a fed-
eral action will completely extinguish an endangered life form or criti-
cal habitat, the judiciary will have very little choice but to enjoin the
activity. The Court's decision did not address the more difficult factual
situations in which species or habitat impact is unclear or debatable.
Left for future cases are questions concerning (1) when agencies must
is especially noteworthy because it virtually eliminates one possible defense to future ESA ac-
tions-that of retroactivity. Since the date of this Supreme Court opinion, other federal courts
have cited the Court's language regarding the issue of implied legislative repeal. In Preterm, Inc.
v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 131 (1st Cir. 1979), the appeals court referred to TVA v. Hill as disfavor-
ing repeal by implication, especially in the form of appropriation measures. It went on, however,
to distinguish the facts in the Endangered Species Act context from those before the court involv-
ing federal funding for abortions. Id at 133-34. See also Zbaraz v. Quern, 596 F.2d 196, 201-02
(7th Cir. 1979) (referring to TMI v. Hill and distinguishing it).
The Supreme Court has recently rejected a constitutional challenge to the validity of two
other protective wildlife statutes-the Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668A (1976), and the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1976). In Andrus v. Allard, 100 S. Ct. 318 (1979), the
Court upheld Department of the Interior regulations that prohibited commercial activity in parts
of birds legally killed prior to the amendment of the statutes. Although it decided the crucial 5th
amendment claim with questionable reasoning, the Court once again took a highly protective
position regarding wildlife preservation. d. at 328.
113. 437 U.S. at 187-88.
114. See id at 173-74, 182-88. One court, considering a challenge to federal dam construction
and operation after TMA v. Hill, criticized the efforts of the Tennessee Valley Authority in at-
tempting to circumvent the command of the ESA and avoid its substantive purpose by noting,
"Thus stands a multimillion dollar facility that cannot be utilized for anything other than a monu-
ment to governmental bungling." South Carolina Wildlife Fed. v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118,
134-35 (D.S.C. 1978).
The Supreme Court's decision in TVM v. Hill and the 1978 amendments to the Endangered
Species Act have made most courts aware of the legal protections, both procedural and substan-
tive, afforded endangered species. At least one federal court, however, has recently ignored the
law developed in the last two years. In Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project v.
Brown, 468 F. Supp. 190 (D. Hawaii 1979), the United States Navy proposed to relocate a muni-
tions storage facility capable of storing nuclear weapons to the West Loch branch of its Pearl
Harbor Naval Base in Honolulu, Hawaii. I at 191-92. Plaintiffs sought an injunction against
the move, claiming a violation of NEPA, the ESA and the National Historic Preservation Act. Id
at 191. No environmental impact statement had been prepared due to an alleged conflict with the
Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2014(y) (1976). The Navy had concluded, without any consulta-
tion with the Fish and Wildlife Service or the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, that the
project would not affect any endangered species nor any historic property. 468 F. Supp. at 192. In
denying the injunction, the district court accepted all the Navy's assertions in complete satisfaction
of the statutes involved without any specific consideration of the federal case law or the relevant
legislation. This case is an extreme aberration of the emerging case law and can be best explained
by the nature of the proposed federal action.
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take protective actions with respect to endangered species, and (2) what
level of proof is necessary to establish an agency's obligation to act.
By interpreting section 7 expansively, and halting the Tellico Dam
project, the Supreme Court practically invited congressional amend-
ment of the ESA. As expected, congressional reaction to the TVA v.
Hill decision was quick. Within four months of the Court's decision,
Congress passed the Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978.115
Despite the adverse publicity generated by the snail darter controversy,
however, strong congressional support for endangered species protec-
tion continued. Congress did not choose to exempt the Tellico project
from the application of section 7, and the substantive scope of that sec-
tion was not significantly weakened. Instead, an amendment was en-
acted that reaffirmed the pre-existing policy against federal actions
damaging endangered species and their habitats. The new statute em-
phasized agency consideration of the species question early in the plan-ning process and created a system of administrative review to resolve
the serious project/endangered species conflicts that would arise in the
future. The 1978 amendments were followed by a technical amend-
ments act in 1979,'16 which clarified the 1978 amendments and ex-
tended the funding authorization for the federal endangered species
program. 1
17
V. THE 1978 ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
TVA v. Hill dramatically focused public attention upon an extreme
conflict between a public works project and endangered species protec-
tion. It was inevitable that Congress would act by either eliminating
the immediate problem embodied in the Tellico controversy" 8 or by
115. Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978) (amending Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub.
L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884).
116. Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-159, 93 Stat. 1225.
117. When Congress enacted the 1978 amendments, it only provided a funding authorization
for activities taken pursuant to the Act before March 31, 1980. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1542(l)(2)
(West Cum. Supp. 1979). This short authorization period ensured that the federal endangered
species program would be reexamined by Congress in less than one year. Senate Bill 1143, the
1979 three-year authorization bill, was finally passed on December 19, 1979 and signed by the
President on December 28, 1979, 15 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 2288 (Dec. 31, 1979). Al-
though described as a funding measure, the 1979 amendments made some subtle and significant
changes in the law. As is frequently the case, these "technical amendments" to a complex statute
were approved without substantial discussion.
118. In the signing statement for the 1978 Endangered Species Act, President Carter stressed
his belief that no amendment to the Act was necessary. 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc, 2002
(Nov. 10, 1978).
Justice Powell, in his dissent in TV v. Hill, stated that the Court's decision would prompt
quick congressional action to overturn the majority's position. He noted:
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establishing a general procedure for resolving such conflicts. In TVA v.
Hill, the Supreme Court had accorded section 7 a very expansive inter-
pretation and had raised endangered species issues as a major environ-
mental hurdle before an ever-expanding range of federal actions.' 19
Other project/species conflicts would certainly arise in the future, and
congressional leaders were pressed to provide federal agencies with the
guidance needed to avoid the recurrence of a Tellico situation.
Legislative proposals amending the 1973 Act were developed by
both the House and the Senate before the TV4 v. Hill decision was
issued.' 20  The first bill to appear, H.R. 10883,121 was essentially a
funding authorization needed to continue the federal endangered spe-
cies program for three years." As such, it was absolutely essential as a
programmatic authorization; yet the bill contained no reference to ei-
ther section 7 or the ongoing Tellico litigation. House action concern-
ing the problems with section 7 and the Tellico project was delayed
until oversight hearings could be held.123  The Senate, however, di-
I have little doubt that Congress will amend the Endangered Species Act to prevent
the grave consequences made possible by today's decision. Few, if any, Members of that
body will wish to defend an interpretation of the Act that requires the waste of at least
$53 million .... and denies the people of the Tennessee Valley area the benefits of the
reservoir that Congress intended to onfer. .. . If Congress acts expeditiously, as may
be anticipated, the Court's decision probably will have no lasting adverse consequences.
437 U.S. at 153, 211. Justice Powell's apparent expectation that Congress would exempt the Tel-
lico project from the coverage of the Act never materialized either through statutory amendment
or administrative action in 1978. But see note 149 and accompanying text infra.
119. The potential impact of the Act, and particularly § 7, can be illustrated by the following
statistics. In the spring of 1978, there were 621 endangered and 39 threatened species of animals
and plants formally listed. At that time, 111 animal species and 1,867 plant species had been
proposed for listing. See H.R. RaP. No. 1026, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1978). With an increaie in
the number of listed species, and the associated increase in critical habitat areas, project/species
confficts will be even more likely. The Department of Interior estimated that the number of § 7
consultations in the 1979 fiscal year alone would reach 20,000. This must be compared to a total
of 4,500 consultations undertaken in the entire five-year period prior to fiscal 1979. See S. RP.
No. 874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 203 (1978). The Committee report on S. 2899, the Senate bill
amending the Act, specifically noted that, "[t]estimony received by the committee indicates that a
substantial number of Federal actions currently underway appear to have all the elements of an
irresolvable conflict with the provisions of the act." See id at 2.
120. The Supreme Court issued its opinion in TVA v. Hill on June 15, 1978. Two bills, H.R.
10883 and S. 2899, were reported from committees to the House of Representatives and the Sen-
ate, respectively, prior to June 15th.
121. 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). The House bill was unanimously passed by the House Com-
mittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and was reported to the House on March 31, 1978 in
order to comply with the provisions of§ 402 of the Congressional Budget Act. See H.R. REP. No.
1026, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1978).
122. The Senate bill, S. 2899, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), providing for an exemption process
through an Endangered Species Committee, contained a similar program authorization for three
fiscal years. See S. REP. No. 874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978).
123. The House Committee report on H.R. 10883 specifically acknowledged the emerging
problems with § 7 and noted-
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rectly confronted the emerging conflict that had focused upon the TV
v. Hill litigation by providing in its bill-S. 2899-a general procedure
for exempting federal actions from the strict requirements of section
7.124 This procedure, employing a cabinet-level Endangered Species
Committee, was intended to provide "flexibility" 125 in the case of a
conflict between a federal project and endangered species. This "flexi-
bility," however, was not to be gained at the expense of the interagency
consultation process that was already mandated by the 1973 Act. In
fact, the Senate committee report reflected a belief that "full and good
faith consultation between the project agency and the Fish and Wildlife
Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service" would eliminate
most controversies prior to any consideration by the newly created En-
dangered Species Committee. 26 Aware of the increasing likelihood of
future Tellico controversies and the danger of piecemeal exemptions,
the Senate passed an exemption provision that would serve as the
model for the 1978 amendments to the Act.
After the Supreme Court issued its opinion in TVA P. Hill on June
15, 1978, the movement to substantively amend the 1973 Act began to
gain momentum. The Senate passed its version of the Endangered
Species Act Amendments-S. 2899-on July 19, 1978.127 At that point,
The committee plans to conduct extensive oversight hearings on the impact of section 7
of the act on Federal development activities during April 1978. The committee feels that
any amendments to section 7 of the act should be withheld until it has had an opportu-
nity to thoroughly review the operation of section 7.
H.R. REP. No. 1026, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978).
124. S. Rep. No. 874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978). The Senate Committee on Environment
and Public Works, which reported S. 2899, indicated that, even though the proposed bill did not
exempt the Tellico project from the Act, it believed the project to be "the type of Federal action
which should be eligible for review by the Endangered Species Committee. . .and given appro-
priate consideration for an exemption under the new review process mandated in this legislation."
Id at 2. Ironically, when the Endangered Species Committee finally did consider the project
pursuant to the provisions of the 1978 amendments, it unanimously rejected the exemption re-
quest, using the same standards contained in S. 2899. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1979, at A-21, col.
3 (city ed.); note 143 infra.
125. The term "flexibility" can have a myriad of meanings, especially in the political context.
The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, possibly anticipating the United States
Supreme Court decision in TVA v. Hill, indicated that "some flexibility is needed in the act to
allow consideration of those cases where Federal action cannot be completed or its objectives
cannot be met without directly conflicting with the requirements of section 7." S. REP. No. 874,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978). It seems clear that the Senate Committee considered § 7 consulta-
tion to be mandatory and a finding that a federal action would jeopardize endangered species to
be sufficient to stop a federal project.
126. Id at 5-6. The Senate's approach stressed a thorough exhaustion of threshold questions
in the consultation process prior to any formal consideration of an exemption request by the
Endangered Species Committee. This interpretation fortifies the role and power of the Fish and
Wildlife Service or National Marine Fisheries Service in the process and also narrows the number
of possible exemption petitions likely to reach the Endangered Species Committee. Id
127. 124 CONG. R c. S11,158 (daily ed. July 19, 1978). The final vote on S. 2899 was 94 to 3
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however, the House had only developed a bill-H.R. 10883-to extend
funding authorization for three years. Consequently, considerable ef-
fort was put forth to produce a bill that would not only address the
section 7 issues and the Tellico Dam problem but also result in a com-
prehensive amendment to the 1973 Act. As the Ninety-Fifth Congress
drew to a close, H.R. 1410428 was passed by the House of Representa-
tives after receiving eleven floor amendments. 12 9 The next day, both
the House and the Senate approved a conference report on the endan-
gered species legislation.' 30 Nearly one month later, President Carter
signed the legislation that was to become the Endangered Species Act
of 1978,131 and nearly fourteen months later, the President signed into
law a bill further refining the major 1978 amendments. 132
in favor of passage.- The committee bill, however, was modified by eleven floor amendments. Id
at S1I,111-49.
128. The original comprehensive House bill-H.R. 13807-was introduced on August 9, 1978
and considered by the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Eight days of hearings and five days of markup sessions pre-
ceded the subcommittee's unanimous adoption of the bill. This proposal, in the form of a clean
bill H.R. 14104, was reported to the full Committee on September 18, 1978. The next day the
Committee sent the bill to the House of Representatives for consideration. See H.R. REP. No.
1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1978), reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9453,
9453-54.
129. 124 CONG. REc. H12,868-905 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978). The most notable floor amend-
ment was offered by Representative John J. Duncan of Tennessee. Mr. Duncan's proposal, which
passed on a vote of 231-157, would have exempted the Tellico dam project from the coverage of
the Endangered Species Act. Id at H12890-93. Citing high local employment on the project,
increasing energy needs, the near-complete status of the project and the alleged transplantation of
the endangered snail darter, Representatives Duncan, Lloyd and Quillen of the Tennessee delega-
tion and Representative Roncalio of Wyoming argued forcefully in favor of the Tellico exemption
provision. Id
130. The managers of both the Senate and House bills asserted to their colleagues that the
Conference Report on S. 2899 reflected a minor accommodation with the other house that pre-
served the essence of their original bills. Senator John C. Culver of Iowa noted that the confer-
ence agreement contained
"many elements of the original Senate bill" and that this is a very sensible solution to a
very complex and controversial issue. It provides flexibility in the administration of the
Endangered Species Act, and avoids ad hoe exemptions or an emasculation of the act
while at the same time maintaining strong protection for our endangered fish, wildlife,
and plants.
124 CONG. REc. S19,160 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978). In recommending acceptance of the Confer-
ence Report, Representative John M. Murphy stressed its similarity to the House bill and added
that "this is a good bill. It introduces significant flexibility into the Endangered Species Act. But
we have not gutted the act in the process." Id at H13,579.
131. 14 WEEKLY COMp. OF PREs. Doc. 2002 (Nov. 13, 1978).
132. See note 117 supra. The wisdom of amending the federal endangered species law in such
short succession may be questioned. Although a part of the 1979 amendments involve a subject
untreated in 1978 amendments (International Convention Implementation), the majority of the
legislative modifications represent both substantive and procedural changes in federal law that
should have been considered with the original 1978 amendments.
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A. Tellico Dam Provision
The Tellico Dam controversy, as highlighted by the TVA v. Hill
decision, provided a dramatic example of the conflicting values of re-
gional development and species preservation. In many ways, Congress'
disposition of the Tellico issue reflected the congressional treatment of
the entire Act during the 1978 amendment process-procedural modifi-
cation, but reaffirmation of pro-species legislative policy. It was feared
that adverse congressional reaction to the snail darter case would result
in a significant weakening of the entire federal endangered species pro-
gram. At the very least, an exemption of the Tellico project from the
Act's coverage seemed a distinct possibility. The bill that was finally
enacted, however, did not establish an exemption for Tellico or even
create a special test for evaluating the merits of the project. Instead, the
TVA dam and reservoir project was to be considered in a system of
administrative review guided by statutory principles.' 33 Although the
future of the Tellico project was to be determined in an expedited fash-
ion,'34 this determination was to be made under the same general ex-
emption procedure 135 established in section 7 of the Act for all future
project/species conflicts. 136 By denying the TVA preferential treatment
133. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1539(i)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
134. The procedure bypassed the normal first stage review board analysis required for future
projects. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(g) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amended 1979). The statute re-
quired the Endangered Species Committee considering the Tellico project and the Grayrocks
Dam and Reservoir project on the Laramie River in Wyoming to meet within 30 days of the date
of enactment and render a decision no later than 90 days after enactment. If no decision was
issued by that date, the exemptions would automatically issue. Id § 1539(i)(1). This is a much
shorter time schedule than is provided for future exemption requests. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(g)-
(h) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amended 1979).
135. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(h) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amended 1979). The Conference
Report indicated the difficulty generally encountered in the resolution of the Tellico and
Grayrocks projects, which had been judicially enjoined at the time of the conference. The confer-
ence report succinctly described the necessary tradeoff regarding this issue: "The language [re-
garding the Tellico and Grayrocks projects] adopted by the conference committee is an attempt to
address the specific project concerns voiced in the House with the Senate desire to preserve the
integrity of the exemption process." H.R. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25, reprinted /n
[19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9453, 9492.
136. For a detailed discussion of the § 7 exemption procedure, see notes 228-309 and accom-
panying text infra. Two other exemption procedures are authorized by the amended Act. First, if
the Secretary of Defense "finds that such exemption is necessary for reasons of national security,"
the Endangered Species Committee must grant the exemption "for any agency action." 16
U.S.C.A. § 15360) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). This exceedingly broad power caused President
Carter to mention in his bill signing statement that "I am asking ... that the exercise of possible
national security exemptions by the Secretary of Defense be undertaken only in grape circun-
stancesrposing a clear and immediate threat to national security." 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES.
Doc. 2002 (Nov. 1, 1978) (emphasis added). Second, the President is authorized to grant exemp-
tions "for the repair or replacement of a public facility" in any area declared to be a major disaster
area under the Disaster Relief Act of 1974. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(p) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
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in this case, Congress fortified both the requirement of the Act that
project agencies must consult federal species experts in the early stages
of the project planning process and the substantive mandate that agen-
cies' actions must not "jeopardize the continued existence of any en-
dangered or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modifications of [critical habitat]."' 37 Relief from this strict standard
could only come by way of administrative exemption.
3 8
A good illustration of how the general exemption process created
by the 1978 amendments is designed to work is provided by the appli-
cation of the process to the Tellico project. Under the exemption proc-
ess, a statutorily designated Endangered Species Committee (ESC)
decided whether the Tellico project could be completed. The Commit-
tee, composed of selected federal agency heads and one state represen-
tative,13 9 was directed to evaluate the project on the basis of three
standards. In order to grant an exemption, the panel had to find that
(1) there were no "reasonable and prudent" alternatives to completion
of the dam," (2) the benefits of completion "clearly outweigh[ed] the
benefits of alternative courses of action consistent with conserving the
species or its critical habitat," '' and (3) the action was "in the public
137. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
138. Id
139. The Committee is composed of seven members, including six officials of the federal gov-
ernment (the Secretaries of Agriculture, the Army and the Interior, the Administrators of the
Environmental Protection Agency and the National Oceanic and Administration, and the Chair-
man of the Council of Economic Advisors) and one member selected by the President from nomi-
nees recommended by state governors. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(e)(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). The
original Senate bill-S. 2899-provided for seven members, but the chairman of the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) was substituted for the Administrator of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration. S. REP. No. 874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978). The House bill-
H.R. 14,104-allowed for only six members on its version of the Endangered Species Committee
and omitted the Administrator of EPA and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
while adding the Chairman of CEQ. See H.R. 1404, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., § 7(e) (1978), 124
CONG. REC. H12,878 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978).
140. 16 U.S.C.A. S 1539(i)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1979); id § 1536(h)(1)(A)(i). This standard
also appears in § 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1976). That
provision prohibits "the use of any publicly owned land from a public park, recreation area, or
wildlife and waterfowl refuge of national, State, or local significance ... , or any land from an
historic site... unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land: and
(2) such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to such [areas]." This standard
might have seemed unreasonably strict to proponents of the Tellico project in light of the exacting
interpretation given those words in Citizens to Protect Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971),
in which the Supreme Court said that the standard "is a plain and explicit bar to the use of federal
funds for construction of highways through parks--only the most unusual situations are ex-
empted." Id at 411. This prompted Representative Robin L. Beard of Tennessee to offer a floor
amendment to H.R. 14104 changing the phrase "no feasible and prudent alternative" to read "no
reasonable and prudent alternative." See 124 CONG. REc. H12,881 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978).
141. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(ii) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
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interest."14 On January 23, 1979, the Endangered Species Committee
by unanimous action granted an exemption for a Wyoming dam proj-
ect but simultaneously denied the application for the Tellico dam. The
ESC found that the Tellico project failed to meet the first two prongs of
the statutory exemption test. 43 Describing the project as "ill conceived
and uneconomical in the first place,"'" Secretary of the Interior Cecil
D. Andrus announced the Committee's decision. 45 The supporters of
the Tellico project, however, refused to accept defeat at the hands of
the ESC. 14 6 Attacking the economic findings of the Committee 1 7 and
claiming that the endangered snail darter had been successfully trans-
142. Id The term "public interest" is undefined in the Act. The third prong of the normal
exemption procedure is a finding that agency action for which exemption is sought is of regional
or national significance. Id § 1536(h)(1)(A)(iii), This test was omitted in review of the Tellico
and Grayrocks projects upon the specific directive of Congress. Id § 1539(i)(1). Congress evi-
dently assumed that these projects met the "significance" test. The Conference Report described
"in the public interest" as a finding of the Endangered Species Committee that "an agency action
must affect some interest, right or duty of the community at large in a way which they would
perceive as positive." H.R. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 9453, 9488.
143. See Application for Exemption for Tellico Dam and Reservoir Project 2-3 (1979) (on file
with author). The ESC determined that there were reasonable and prudent alternatives to the
project and that the benefits of the Tellico proposal did not clearly outweigh the benefits stemming
from other options. Had the ESC failed to act by February 8, 1979, both the Tellico and the
Grayrocks projects would have been automatically exempted from the Act. See 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 1539(i)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
144. See 9 ENVIR. R p. (BNA) 1776 (1979).
145. Soon after the ESC decision was issued, the TVA directed its staffto prepare an options
paper outlining potential solutions to the Tellico problem. On February 19, 1979, the staff pro-
duced a paper discussing two approaches-a river development option and a reservoir plan. See 9
ENv. REP. (BNA) 1833, 2043-44 (1979). Even if, as a final resolution of the Tellico controversy,
the project would have had to be abandoned, it is certain that the actual financial loss suffered by
the government would have been greatly minimized by the appreciated value of the land acquired
for the project. See 124 CONG. REc. H12892 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Forsythe).
In addition, Senator John H. Chafee, in successfully arguing against a subsequent legislative at-
tempt to exempt the Tellico project, stated that 38,000 acres of land had already been acquired for
the project and that only $22 million of the $116 million spent for the dam had gone for construc-
tion. 125 CONG. REc. S7547, S7552 (daily ed. June 13, 1979). A similar argument was made by
Senator John C. Culver in a later unsuccessful effort to block the Tellico exemption amendment.
See id. at S 12,270, S 12,275 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1979).
146. Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. of Tennessee unsuccessfully attempted to amend the En-
dangered Species Act authorization extension bill-S. 1143--to exempt the Tellico project, both
before the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee on May 9, 1979 and the full Senate
on June 13, 1979. The Committee vote was 8-3 against the amendment. See 37 CONG. Q. 888,
1142-43 (1979). However reluctant the Senate may have been to grant the Tellico project a special
exemption, the House of Representatives had no such hesitation. On August 2, 1979, the House
voted to exempt the Tellico project by a 258 to 156 majority. See 125 CONG. REc. H7223 (daily
ed. Aug. 2, 1979).
147. The Endangered Species Committee's finding that the Tellico project was economically
unsound was attacked by proponents of the dam who claimed that the annual benefit/cost deficit
of approximately $720,000 was due to the "creative accounting" of the ESC. See 125 CoNe. REC.
S12,273 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Sasser). Other TVA studies had shown a net
benefit of 2.3-2.6 to 1 and 3.3 to 1. See 125 CONG. REC. S 12,278 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1979).
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planted,1 48 proponents of the dam sought special legislative relief for
their project. After being rebuffed several times during 1979, they
finally secured a statutory exemption by appending the Tellico provi-
sion to the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act.149
The Tellico Dam case reveals a number of things about the system
of project evaluation mandated by the 1978 Act. It illustrates how the
administrative review procedure functions when presented with a re-
quest for a deviation from the clear congressional policy choice favor-
ing the preservation of endangered species. The Tellico case proved
that a high-level governmental panel could withstand significant politi-
cal pressures supporting an exemption request. Although the Tellico
case may present an unusual and extreme example of project/species
conflict because of the degree of completion of the project, the amount
of funds already expended, the nature of the imperiled species and the
amount of local support, it does focus attention on the method that
Congress has created for making these difficult decisions involving con-
flicting social values. Although Congress may have reversed itself on
the Tellico issue and passed a special exemption, this does not reflect an
intrinsic weakness in the national support for endangered species pro-
tection or the administrative review system created by the Act. The
clarity of the federal statutory policy imposing a consultation require-
ment and a substantive standard for agency decisionmaking will ensure
that a similar factual situation does not recur.150
148. It was asserted that the snail darter had been successfully transplanted into the Hiwassee
River in Tennessee and was reported in other states as well. Furthermore, it was claimed that the
species was no longer present in its original habitat--the Little Tennessee River. This latter point
was made to demonstrate the ultimate irrationality of barring the completion of the Tellico dam
and not to illustrate the destructive impact of the previous construction activity. See 125 CoNo.
REc. S12,273 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1979). In a letter to Representative Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.,
however, Secretary of the Interior Cecil D. Andres disputed the conclusion that the transplanta-
tion had been successful. See 125 CONG. REc. H7218 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1979).
149. The Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93
Stat. 437 (1979), became the vehicle for the Senate's concurrence with the House exemption.
There was some evidence that the House members had threatened to delay passage of the $10.8
billion appropriations measure if the Senate did not accede to the Tellico exemption amendment.
See 125 CONG. Rnc. S12,274-75 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Johnston and Culver).
On September 10, 1979, the Senate finally agreed by a vote of 48 to 44 to exempt the Tellico
project from the Endangered Species Act and any other federal law. Id at S12,279.
150. Of greater likelihood is a series of legislative attacks upon the new § 7 procedural and
substantive requirements. Ironically, President Carter's decision to sign the Energy and Water
Development Appropriations bill, which included the Tellico exemption, may have forestalled
more damaging modifications to the Endangered Species Act. In his signing statement the Presi-
dent noted that "I am convinced that this resolution of the Tellico matter will help assure the
passage of the Endangered Species Act reauthorization without weakening amendments or further
exemptions." 15 WEEKLY COMP. OF PR.s. Doc. 1760 (Sept. 15, 1979). On December 28, 1979,
the President signed the three-year funding authorization bill for the ESA, which contained a
number of modifications in the § 7 standards. See notes 117, 132 & 146 supra.
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An analysis of other provisions of the Endangered Species Act and
its 1978 amendments is warranted at this point. The examination will
reveal a scientific system of species protection that minimizes counter-
vailing economic considerations and stresses early planning review as a
means of avoiding damaging governmental actions. Significantly, the
system is essentially administrative and accords the judiciary an ex-
tremely limited role.
B. Listing of Endangered and Threatened Species
The starting point for a governmental system protecting life forms
from extinction is the identification of those biological entities worthy
of the special protections created by law. Although some varieties of
animal life have been preserved by specific legislative actions,151 since
1969 the identification of endangered species has been undertaken as
an administrative function of the Fish and Wildlife Service within the
Department of Interior.'52 The 1973 Act devoted more attention to the
listing process 153 and expanded eligible species to include plants as well
as fish and wildlife.154 Listing authority, originally residing with the
Secretary of Interior, was to be shared under the Act with the Secretary
of Commerce, who had jurisdiction over marine species by virtue of a
1970 executive reorganization plan. 55 In addition, the 1973 statute cre-
ated two categories into which listed species could be placed-
threatened and endangered.
With the passage of the 1973 Act, the Secretaries of Interior and
Commerce were provided with specific procedural guidance 5 6 in the
maintenance of the endangered species list. With the exception of brief
151. E.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1976) (bald eagles); 16 U.S.C. §§ 851-856 (1976) (black
bass); 16 U.S.C.A. § 1371 (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1979) (marine mammals).
152. Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, § 3(a), 83 Stat. 275
(1969) (repealed 1973). This statute required the Secretary of Interior to list formally in the Fed-
eral Register fish or wildlife species "deemed to be threatened with worldwide extinction." Id
§ 2. Any person importing such "fish or wildlife" could be subject to both civil and criminal
penalties. Id § 4. The intention of this legislation was to control the international trade in endan-
gered wildlife.
153. Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1976) (amended 1978, 1979).
154. See id § 3(11), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (amended 1978).
155. See Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970, 84 Stat. 2090 (1970); (creating the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration). The powers of the Secretary of Commerce were
mainly confined to the initial listing of a species or a re-listing from threatened to endangered
status. De-listing or downgrading from endangered to threatened status can only be accomplished
with the consent of the Secretary of Interior. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 4(A)(2), 16
U.S.C. § 1533(a)(2)(A)(B)(1976).
156. See 1973 Act, § 4(b)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1) (1976) (amended 1978, 1979); Id, 16
U.S.C. § 1533(a)(2)(A), (B) (1976); Id., 16 U.S.C. § 1533()(1)(1976)(amended 1978).
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definitions of the terms "endangered" and "threatened," '57 however,
the Act left the matter of deciding whether to list a species to the ad-
ministrative discretion of the two agencies involved. 158 The listing de-
cision was to be based on "the best scientific and commercial data
available" 159 and made after discussion with interested parties.' 60  In
essence, the decision to list a species formally was to be dependent
upon a scientific determination of the likelihood of species extinc-
tion.1 61  Although listing was theoretically to be a non-discretionary
act, once that determination was made the ultimate decision to list
rested squarely within the prerogative of the listing agency.' 62  After
TV v. Hill, the importance of the listing decision, when considered in
combination with the section 7 procedural and substantive duties, be-
came magnified. It became apparent that the listing of an endangered
157. The 1973 statute defines an "endangered species" as one "in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of its range," id § 3(4), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(4) (1976), and a
"threatened species" as one that is "likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable
future," id § 3(11), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(11) (1976).
158. There appear to be no regulations in force that explain the listing process or the standards
for listing. The regulations that have been published merely identify endangered or threatened
species once they have been found eligible for listing. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.11, .12 (1978). See also
id § 402.05(b) (1978) (criteria for determining the critical habitat of a listed species). New regula-
tions governing the listing of species and designation of critical habitat have been proposed. 44
Fed. Reg. 47,862 (1979).
159. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1) (1976) (amended 1978, 1979). This standard for listing was origi-
nally provided in the 1969 Act and similar language appears in other wildlife statutes. See M.
BEAN, supra note 17, at 376 n.21. The 1978 amendments modified this standard for the designa-
tion of critical habitat to be "the best scientifc data available." 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(f)(4) (West
Cum. Supp. 1979). It is unclear whether this difference in language reflects a congressional intent
to exclude "commercial data" from the critical habitat determination or whether the omission is
merely an oversight.
160. The 1973 Act required that the Secretary making the listing decision consult with "af-
fected States, interested persons and organizations, other interested Federal agencies, and [where
appropriate, foreign countries]." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1) (amended 1978, 1979).
161. Although the listing of an endangered or threatened species is theoretically a scientific
judgment by the Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service, some con-
gressmen have criticized these agencies for having no established guidelines for species listing. In
the course of the floor debate on H.R. 14104, one legislator asserted that the decision to consider a
species for listing was "based entirely on the whim of the service biologist." See 124 CONG. REc.
H12,870 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Beard). Representative John Buchanan of
Alabama specifically questioned "the accuracy and objectivity" of the FWS proposal to list the
Cahaba Shiner and the Goldline Darter as endangered species. See 124 CONG. REc. H12,872
(daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978).
162. Under the 1973 Act, there was no time constraint imposed upon the Secretary with the
responsibility to list formally a threatened or endangered species. Therefore, an external request
for listing or de-listing of a species did not have to be acted upon within any predetermined time
period. In addition, the Fish and Wildlife Service often proposed the formal listing of a species
but waited a long period before acting or never made the regulation final. This was the claim of
Representative Robin L. Beard of Tennessee, who successfully argued in favor of an eighteen-
month authorization period in the Act, rather than the three-year period originally considered by
the House. See 124 CONG. REc. H12,870 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Beard).
NORTH CAROLINA L,4W REVIEW V
or threatened species and the designation of its critical habitat could
dramatically affect the future of many federal projects.
The TV,4 v. Hill decision placed a heavy emphasis on section 7
consultation and a strict duty on federal agencies not to "jeopardize the
continued existence"' 63 of listed endangered species or their habitats.
When Congress considered the 1978 amendments to the Act, there
seemed to be a general consensus in favor of making the ESA more
"flexible."' 64 It was thus possible that major legislative modifications
could have been made in the keystone of the Act-the listing process.
A number of these suggested changes were ostensibly proposed to im-
prove the functioning of the process, but they could have seriously
weakened the statute. The underlying theory of American species leg-
islation has been to identify and protect biological species regardless of
their commercial or aesthetic value. A variety of plant or animal that is
in danger of extinction should be preserved because of its uniqueness
and the threat to that special quality. The federal policy has been
based upon scientific determinations that a particular species is endan-
gered, not political decisions that the specific plant or animal is worthy
of federal protection. 65 In this way federal law regards all species as
being equal in their value to society.
Against all the pressure to amend the Act to make it compatible
with a variety of interests, 66 the formal listing process emerged rela-
tively intact. The procedure, however, has been modified in several
ways. The listing agency, remains free to select any species 67 of plant
163. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amended 1979).
164. Throughout the development of the 1978 amendments, modifications were suggested in
the hope of building flexibility into what had been characterized by the Supreme Court in TVA v.
Hill as a rigid system. This was the common perception in Congress and one that spurred the
actual amendment process. See H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14, reprinted in
[19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEws 9453, 9463-64. The changes that were finally made to the
federal endangered species program were usually made to accommodate the developmental inter-
est and were often described as "compromises." Id
165. An attempt to narrow the scope of species eligible for federal protection, however, re-
cently surfaced in a floor amendment to the Senate bill extending the funding authorization for
the Endangered Species Act-S. 1143. Senator Henry Bellmon of Oklahoma offered an amend-
ment that would have limited the protection of the Act to those species determined by the Secre-
tary of the Interior to have "an economic or aesthetic value to man." The proposed amendment
was defeated by a vote of 80 to 14. 125 CONG. REc. S7554-56 (daily ed. June 13, 1979). Such a
proposal raises serious questions about the direction of the federal policy on endangered species
and the morality of designating certain life forms as less worthy of continued existence than
others.
166. Eleven floor amendments were added to both the House and Senate versions of the ESA
when the bills--H.R. 14104 and S. 2899-were before the respective bodies. See notes 120, 128 &
129 supra. Most of these amendments were exemptions of particular interests from the coverage
of the Act. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C.A. § 15360) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (national security exemption).
167. The Act only excludes one type of life form from its coverage. In the definition of "en-
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or animal for listing based upon a scientific determination of endanger-
ment.' 68  The 1978 amendments redefined the term "species" to ex-
clude groupings below the subspecies level and certain invertebrate
animals. 16 9 Although this would appear to reduce the number of ani-
mals eligible for listing, the precise impact of the definitional change at
this point is unclear. 7 A listing decision must still be based upon "the
best scientific and commercial data available,"' 7 1 although the stan-
dard for a critical habitat designation has been framed in slightly dif-
ferent language.
1 72
dangered species," insects that the Secretary of the Interior considers a "pest whose protection
under the provisions of this chapter would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to man"
are excluded. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(6) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). In a debate concerning the exten-
sion of the Act's funding authorization, Senator John C. Culver explained the exception for insects
constituting pests as one that was necessary for the control of crop-threatening insects such as
locusts and boll weevils whose numbers "may not be plentiful one year, but, due to a sudden surge
of breeding, may overrun croplands the next year. That was the one narrow exception." 125
CONG. REC. S7555 (daily ed. June 13, 1979).
168. The Secretary involved must also conduct a "status review" on the species before it is
formally proposed for listing as either endangered or threatened. See Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub.
L. No. 96-159, § 3(1), 93 Stat. 1225 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)). This amendment
extends the status review requirement presently applicable for petitioned listing changes, 16
U.S.C.A. § 1533(c)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amended 1979), to those originating within the
Departments of the Interior and Commerce. The stated intention of this additional procedural
obligation is to provide the listing agency with the most current data base upon which to reach a
decision. See H.R. REP. No. 697, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 9-10, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4776, 4776-77.
169. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(16) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). This provision originated in simi-
lar form in the House bill-H.R. 14104-and was accepted by the Conference Committee. See
124 CONG. Rc. H 12,879 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978). There was very little explanation given for the
change. The Conference Report notes:
The existing definition of "species" in the act includes subspecies of animals and
plants, taxonomic categories below subspecies in the case of animals, as well as distinct
populations of vertebrate species." The d§inition included in the conference report would
exclude taxonomic categories below subspeciesfrom the defmition as well as distinct popula-
tions of in vertebrates.
H.R. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 9453, 9492 (emphasis added).
170. In the course of the floor debate in the House of Representatives on H.R. 14104, concern
was voiced over the potential number of animal and plant species and subspecies that could be
considered for listing under the Act, Representative Robert Duncan claimed that the Fish and
Wildlife Service had estimated that there were approximately 1.4 million full species of animals
and 600,000 full species of plants in the world. In addition, he asserted that there were three to
five times as many subspecies. Responding to the threat of the "unreasonable application of this
act," Representative Duncan successfully offered a floor amendment redefining and limiting "spe-
cies" to, "a group of fish, wildlife, or plants, consisting of physically similar organisms capable of
interbreeding but generally incapable of producing fertile offspring through breeding with orga-
nisms outside of this group." See 124 CONG. REc. H12,897-98 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks
of Rep. Duncan). This amendment was agreed to by the full House, but it did not survive the
Conference Committee deliberations. See 124 CONG. Rac. H12,897 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (re-
marks of Rep. Dingell in strenuous opposition).
171. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(b)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
172. Id. § 1533(0(4) ("best scientific data available"). For a detailed discussion of the amend-
ments concerning critical habitat, see notes 194-227 and accompanying text infra.
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Three alterations were made in the nature of the actual regulation
announcing the listing of a species. First, when a formal listing is pro-
posed, the agency must indicate, "to the maximum extent prudent," the
critical habitat of the newly listed species. 73 Second, in an apparent
effort to make the decision to list a species an understandable one, Con-
gress has required that the listing agency publish a summary of the data
it considered in arriving at its determination.174 This requirement is
reasonable, and it conforms to administrative norms established in
other areas of environmental law. 7  As the listing decision becomes
subject to closer judicial scrutiny, the sufficiency of this portion of the
listing regulation will undoubtedly be questioned. Third, in response
to the charge that many species were proposed for listing but never
finally listed, 76 the Act was amended to require a regulatory proposal
to become final within two years or be withdrawn. 77 It was argued
that federal agencies would be reluctant to take actions affecting species
proposed for listing because of the fear of becoming embroiled in an
ESA controversy once the species was formally listed. The "two year"
rule could result in delaying the proposal of a species for listing until
173. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(a)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). This provision is a modification of an
amendment to § 1533 that appeared in both the House and Senate bills. The original proposal to
amend § 1533 would have required the designation of a critical habitat concurrently with the
listing of a species unless "an emergency exists because no critical habitat information is available
or there are other contingencies." S. 2899, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 10, 124 CONe. REc. S 1159,
Sl1,120 (daily ed. July 19, 1978). See also 124 CONG. REc. Sl1130-31 (daily ed. July 19, 1978)
(remarks of Sen. Gan). In a colloquy between Senators Gan and Nelson on the effect of this
stricter habitat designation requirement, it was made clear that the inability to specify all areas of
critical habitat would not stop the listing of a species. Id The language actually enacted seems to
impose an even weaker standard on the listing agencies.
174. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(f)(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
175. One similar requirement, having a judicial rather than legislative origin, is the Kennecot
statement derived from the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1973), which de-
manded an explanation of the EPA's decisionmaking process in setting air quality standards.
176. This was the assertion of Representative Robin L. Beard in the floor debates on H.R.
14104. See 124 CONG. REc. H12,868, H12,870 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978). Regardless of whether
the statement reflects the actual concerns of federal agencies, it does by implication suggest an-
other, more vexing problem. If an agency action would jeopardize the continued existence of a
species proposed for listing but not finally listed, could an application be made to the § 7 review
board or Endangered Species Committee for an exemption from § 7? Section 7(a) requires con-
sultation and avoidance of harm to "species listed pursuant to section 4 of this Act." 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 1536(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amended 1979). Subsequent sections within the exemption
procedure only refer to "endangered or threatened species" without reference to their listing. See,
eg., 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(g)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amended 1979). It could be argued that
mere proposal for listing is insufficient to protect a species from damaging federal actions.
177. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(f(5) (west Cum. Supp. 1979) (amended 1979). The effect of the
automatic withdrawal at the expiration of the two-year period is to preclude a future re-proposal
unless there is "sufficient new information... to warrant the proposal of a regulation." Id The
purpose of this approach is to force swift administrative action in order to limit the uncertainty of
federal agencies faced with the policy embodied in § 7 of the Act.
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scientific studies have progressed to the point at which the FWS or the
NMFS is absolutely certain that a final listing will be feasible within a
short period of time.
The most noticeable statutory change in the listing of endangered
species involves the proc edural formalities now necessary prior to the
issuance of a final listing regulation and critical habitat designation."7 8
The 1973 law had only provided for publication of the proposed listing
regulation in the Federal Register prior to becoming final 79 and for the
right to request a public hearing on the regulatory proposal.1 80 In an
effort to make the decision to list a particular species one which in-
volves, to some degree, the citizenry living in the vicinity of the endan-
gered species, the 1978 amendments impose four procedural duties.
First, the proposed action must be published, in its entirety, in the Fed-
eral Register,18 ' and, if a critical habitat is to be designated, a summary
of the proposal is to appear in a newspaper of general circulation
"within or adjacent to such habitat." ' 2 This was denominated "gen-
178. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(f)(2)(B)(i)-(iv) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amended 1979). These pro-
cedural requirements are imposed "[i]n the case of any regulation proposed by the Secretary to
carry out the purposes of this section with respect to the determination and listing of endangered or
threatened species and their critical habitats." 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(f)(2)(B) (West Cum. Supp.
1979) (emphasis added). Although the obligations created by this section clearly apply to the act
of initially listing a species as either threatened or endangered, it is uncertain whether these proce-
dures must be employed when a listed species has its classification changed or when a species is
delisted altogether. The Conference Committee's report merely discusses the procedures in con-
junction with the "listing" of a species. See H.R. REP. No;:1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted
in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9484, 9485-86.
179. 16 US.C. § 1533(f)(2)(A)(i) (1976).
180. Id. § 1533(f)(2)(A)(ii). This section allows "any person who feels that he may be ad-
versely affected by the proposed regulation" to file objections and formally request a public hear-
ing within 45 days of the proposal. The granting of the hearing was discretionary but, if denied,
the reasons had to be set forth in the Federal Register. Compare id with 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 1533(f)(2)(B)(iv)(I)-(II) (West Cum. Supp. 1979), as amended by Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L.
No. 96-159, § 3(3), 93 Stat. 1225.
181. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(f)(2)(B)(i)(I) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amended 1979). This Federal
Register notice requirement is carried over from the previous statute. See text accompanying note
179 supra.
182. The 1978 amendments initially required the complete text of the listing proposal to be
published in a local newspaper. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(f)(2)(B)(i)(II) (West Cum. Supp. 1979)
(amended 1979). The Conference Report provides no guidance as to the precise kind of newspa-
per publication that would satisfy the requirement. See H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
27, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9453, 9468. The general circulation news-
paper sold closest to the proposed critical habitat should suffice. The 1979 Act modified this obli-
gation so that only a summary of the regulation need be published locally. See Act of Dec. 28,
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 3(2), 93 Stat. 1225 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(2)(B)(i)(II)).
A map of the proposed critical habitat area must also be published. Id The legislative history
underlying this change indicates that a summary should contain "the biological justification for
the listing, the justification for the critical habitat designation, and a brief description of the activi-
ties that may adversely modify the critical habitat or may be impacted by the designation of such
habitat." H.R. RP. No. 697, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 102, reprintedin [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. &
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eral notice" by the drafters of the statute. Second, the essence of the
complete regulation must be offered for publication in "appropriate sci-
entific journals."183 The purpose of this provision is to inform the gen-
eral scientific community of the decision to list; this form of notice,
however, probably will not produce timely evidence for the FWS or
NMFS to consider.1 4 Third, "actual notice" of the proposed listing
and any environmental assessment or impact statement prepared on
the proposal must be given to "all general local governments located
within or adjacent to the proposed critical habitat, if any."'185 This re-
quirement, like the one involving newspaper publication, is only appli-
cable when critical habitats are specified at the time of species listing.
Thus, the listing agency may refrain from habitat designation in order
to avoid these additional procedural obligations. Finally, the 1978
amendments require that a public "meeting," '186 and in some cases an
additional public "hearing,"'' 7 be conducted near the location of the
endangered species proposed for listing. Although this form of public
involvement in the administrative process makes it possible for local
groups to make their opinions known about a listing proposal or
habitat designation, it may also be used to delay the completion of the
listing procedure. Because several meetings and hearings can be de-
AD. NEws 4776,4778. In light of the current agency practice ofprotecting desirable species by not
specifically locating habitats, the mandatory public identification of critical habitat required by
this amendment could have a damaging effect on species preservation.
183. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(f)(2)(B)(ii) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
184. This provision was also appended to the Senate bill-S. 2899-by a floor amendment
offered by Senator Jake Garn of Utah. See 124 CONG. REc. S 11,111, S 11, 136-37 (daily ed. July
19, 1978). Senator Gain believed that offering the regulatory proposals for journal publication
would cause increased public awareness of species regulation and enable wildlife experts outside
of the government to provide much-needed information prior to final listing. Id Considering the
delay inherent in the publication process and the statutorily mandated two-year time limit be-
tween a proposed and a final listing, however, it is unlikely that useful expert opinion could be
received in time.
185. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(f)(2)(B)(iii) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). The statute terms this "actual
notice" although the Conference Report indicates that the requirement may be satisfied by use of
the A-95 review process. H.R. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprintedin [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9453, 9494.
186. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(f)(2)(B)(iv)(I)-(ll) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amended 1979). A "pub-
lic meeting" may constitute notice of the species listing when no critical habitat is specified. When
a proposal includes the designation of a critical habitat, the public meeting is mandatory "within
the area in which such habitat is located." The public meeting is expected to be "of an informal
variety that would permit a colloquy between representatives of the Department and local citi-
zens." H.R. RaP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 9453, 9494-95. The emphasis is clearly upon the informational, rather than adversarial,
nature of these meetings. The legislative history of the 1979 amendments confirms this informal
characterization. H.R. RaP. No. 697, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONe.
& AD. Naws 4776.
187. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(f)(2)(B)(iv)(ll) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amended 1979).
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manded on the same proposed listing regulation, the date of final effec-
tiveness could be postponed for a significant period of time.188
However useful this expansion of public participation may seem in the
abstract, it probably will not provide any scientific information neces-
sary for the listing determination.' 9 Since that decision is technical in
nature,190 opposition to or support of a listing proposal on economic,
social, or other non-scientific grounds will not be considered by the
agency involved.
The procedural modifications of the endangered species listing
process mandated by the recent amendments will delay the issuance of
final listing decisions.191 The public meeting and hearing requirement
will certainly contribute to the delay, and it may make federal agency
officials reluctant to propose the listing of a species when they have
anything less than overwhelming evidence to support their proposals.
In addition, the costs of operating the administrative procedure will
undoubtedly increase. These modifications may be viewed by some as
a beneficial change in the regulatory approach of the federal govern-
ment concerning endangered and threatened species. Raising the in-
188. The statute specifies that a hearing shall be held if "requested" when a listing proposal is
accompanied by a designation of critical habitat. The granting of such an automatic right to a
hearing could be used to delay the final adoption of a listing regulation and could possibly cause
the two-year time limits contained in id § 1533(0(5) to elapse, which would bar any formal listing
without new information. See note 177 and accompanying text supra. The 1979 amendments
addressed this problem by limiting the availability of the public hearing to situations in which a
request is made within 15 days of the public meeting. See Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-
159, § 3(3), 93 Stat. 1225 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(2)(B)(iv)(ll)).
189. The federal decision to list a species as either "endangered" or "threatened" is guided by
the standard of endangerment from specific causes. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (1976). Once a listing
proposal is made, presumably adequate biological data exists to support the action. It is possible,
though unlikely, that a public meeting or hearing will disclose credible scientific evidence that the
species proposed for listing is in fact not endangered or does not have a critical habitat within the
locality. Such information, if forthcoming, would be helpful in the regulatory proceeding. On the
other hand, general statements concerning projected and speculative economic and social effects
of listing the species, although irrelevant to the listing determination, are likely to be made.
190. See text accompanying note 165 supra.
191. The statute requires that both general and actual notice be provided at least 60 days
before the effective date of the regulation. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(f)(2)(B)(i)&(iii) (West Cum. Supp.
1979). This is not a substantial delay. It is possible, however, that both a public meeting and a
hearing could be required for the proposed listing or habitat designation. The amendments stipu-
late that the proposed regulation may not become effective until 60 days after the last public
meeting or hearing. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(f)(2)(B) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). Although the problem
has been somewhat mitigated by the 1979 amendments, these procedural requirements could be
used to extend the period between the time of the listing proposal and the final effective date. See
note 188 supra. In the event that expeditious action need be taken to protect fish, wildlife or plants
facing any emergency posing a significant risk to their well-being, however, emergency regulations
may be issued for a 240-day period without complying with standard procedures. See 16
U.S.C.A. § 1533()(2)(C)(ii) (West Cum. Supp. 1979), as amended by Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L.
No. 96-158, § 5, 93 Stat. 1225.
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formational threshold needed to justify protective action in this context,
however, could result in a failure to act, which, even if temporary,
might have devastating effects upon the continued existence of a spe-
cies. Like health-related environmental standards,' 92 species preserva-
tion should be accorded priority in the face of indicative but not
overwhelming evidence of species endangerment. If a regulatory error
is made, it should be in favor of species preservation. An overly restric-
tive or unnecessary rule can always be altered or eliminated. The ex-
tinction of a species, on the other hand, is not reversible. The statutory
changes in the listing process, although superficially procedural, may
have subtle effects that will alter the substantive federal species policy
to require a higher standard of information in order to substantiate
protective regulatory action. Taken as a whole, however, the 1978 and
1979 amendments retain the structure and theory of the pre-existing
law, which permits the unrestricted listing of plant and animal species
based exclusively upon biological information showing "endanger-
ment." With this critical element of the federal species program main-
tained without substantial modification, the system of species
protection according primary responsibility to administrative agencies
having expertise in wildlife matters has been preserved.' 93
192. Environmental regulation must often be undertaken without conclusive scientific evi-
dence. The question has been framed in terms of deciding when regulation will be permitted in
the face of varying levels of uncertainty about the possible harmful effects of a substance on
human health. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit resolved
such a conflict by reasoning that the essential purpose of the Clean Air Act was to protect public
health and welfare. Therefore, complete certainty about the harmful effects of lead emissions
from gasoline was not necessary before the Environmental Protection Agency could regulate lead
additives to motor fuel. The court, through Judge Skellk.Wright, determined that, in order to
protect public health, regulatory action should err on the side of over- rather than under-protec-
tion. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), cer. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1977). By analogy it could be argued that, in order to preserve unique forms of life, a similar
judicial deference to administrative action should be shown.
193. The General Accounting Office, in a recent evaluation of the federal endangered species
program, has been critical of the program.'s management. Among the GAO's recommendations
were the following: (1) existing policies, procedures and practices should be consistently applied;
(2) listed species should be de-listed or reclassified when warranted; (3) a priority system for listing
actions should be prepared; and (5) staffing and funding should be increased. See GENERAL Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES: A CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE NEEDING RESOLUTION"
(CED-79-65, 1979). See also 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 730 (1979). In response to these criticisms,
Congress in 1979 directed the federal agencies to issue guidelines to improve the mechanical func-
tioning of the listing petition process, to establish evaluative criteria for listing petitions, to set a
ranking system for determining priority in petition review and to create a system for recovery
plans. See Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 3(b), 93 Stat. 1226 (to be codified at 16
U.S.C. § 1533(h)).
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C. Habitat Designation
The listing process has been shown to serve the crucial function of
identifying those particular life forms that are in danger of becoming
extinct. Such an identification is a basic and essential component of the
federal program to preserve endangered species. The 1973 statute rec-
ognized the close relationship between the continued survival of species
and the preservation of their habitat. Once an endangered and
threatened species has been formally listed, the determination of the
critical habitat of the listed species may follow.194 In many ways speci-
fication of critical habitat may be as significant as the listing of the
species. For instance, while it might be difficult to establish that a pro-
posed federal action would "jeopardize the continued existence" 95 of a
listed species, it would be easier to determine whether that same activ-
ity would "result in the destruction or adverse modification' 196 of the
designated critical habitat. The designation of a species' critical habitat
involves the identification of specific physical boundaries within which
federal activities must comply with the substantive and procedural re-
quirements of section 7 of the Act.' 97 It was feared, especially after
TV v. Hill, that an area formally named as a critical habitat would be
totally ineligible for federal, federally sponsored, or federally licensed
activity. 198 Consequently, when Congress amended the Act in 1978, an
194. Under the 1973 Act, there was no requirement that critical habitats be designated simul-
taneously with the listing of endangered and threatened species. In fact, the term "critical habitat"
was never defined at any place in the statute. The only possible reference to critical habitat is
found in a direction to the listing agency to "specify with respect to each such species over what
portion of its range it is endangered or threatened." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(1) (1976) (amended
1978). Since the passage of the 1973 Act, nearly 700 plant and animal species have been listed as
endangered or threatened. Yet, during that same period, only 29 critical habitats have been for-
mally established. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ANNUAL
REPORT 1978, at 334 (1979) (Tables 7-8). The 1978 amendments specifically permitted the
designation of critical habitat for species that had been listed prior to the amendments but that
had no listed habitats. These designations would be subject to the same limitations applicable to
all new habitat designations. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(5)(B) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
195. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
196. Id At least the critical habitat is a specifically defined geographical area. It would not be
difficult to determine whether the proposed federal action would have direct effects on this partic-
ular area. Obviously, it is more difficult to predict indirect impacts upon a critical habitat or an
endangered species in general.
197. Id § 1536(a).
198. In addition to the perception that endangered species programs posed a threat to local
economic development, the information base and the professional competence of the Fish and
Wildlife Service were severely criticized by one legislator during debate on the House bill amend-
ing the ESA. Representative David R. Bowen of Mississippi noted the following in his floor
speech:
For the first time we are going to have proposed final regulations actually based on
the best scientific data available--current, not old data, but current data. I might indi-
cate that [Representative Jack Brooks of Texas]. . .asked a question about the Houston
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effort was made to restrict the high degree of discretion that had been
previously exercised to establish critical habitats for listed species.199
The first task confronted by Congress was to define the term "criti-
cal habitat" in order to guide the administrative agencies in the estab-
lishment of those protected areas.200 It was commonly believed that
existing critical habitat designations were overinclusive, encompassing
any area where an endangered species could possibly live °.2 0  Further-
more, there was substantial concern that the federally established habi-
tats could extend over vast tracts of land and could include areas
needed not for present survival but for future expansion of species
populations . 2 2  From the starting point of interpreting "critical
habitat" to mean any place where an endangered or threatened species
presently lived or could live in the future,20 3 Congress substantially
limited the definition of the term. In places where species are located at
the time of formal listing, critical habitat can only be designated where
the area is "essential to the conservation of the species" and might "re-
quire special management considerations or protection. ' '2°4 The stan-
dard for habitat where endangered species are presently found appears
to be narrowed by the combination of these two elements.2 5 There-
toad. That is a good example of the mistakes and, frankly, what I must consider the
ineptitude we have seen from time to time on the part of many of the officials of the
Office of Endangered Species. They did designate as the habitat of the Houston toad a
paved parking lot in downtown Houston. When it was brought to their attention, they
then discovered that their maps and research data were somewhat out of date. So, this
legislation obviously goes to correct that kind of problem.
124 CONG. REc. H12,868 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978).
199. The broad grant of discretionary authority accorded the Fish and Wildlife Service to set
critical habitat was especially troubling to Congressmen from states having projects embroiled in
Endangered Species Act litigation. See id at H12,876 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks of Rep.
Johnson of Colorado).
200. See note 65 and accompanying text supra.
201. The sentiment was expressed that critical habitats should only be established for "what is
actually needed for survival of this species." 124 CONG. REc. H12,876 (daily Oct. 14, 1978) (re-
marks of Rep. Bowen of Mississippi). Although such a narrow view of critical habitat did not
prevail, it does reflect a common point of view during the course of the debates.
202. S. REP. No. 874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 10 (1978). The prime example of this phenome-
non is the proposed critical habitat for the grizzly bear, which covers nearly 10 million acres in
three states. The Senate Committee questioned the advisability of the Fish and Wildlife Service's
using the same factors to "extend the range" of an endangered species as are used in determining
areas truly critical "to the continued existence of the species." Id It was recommended that the
concept of a critical habitat be strictly construed in order to avoid the "regulations and prohibi-
tions which apply to critical habitats." Id at 10. The reference was apparently directed to the § 7
requirements.
203. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(5)(A)-(C) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
204. Id § 1532(5)(A)(i)(I)-(ll).
205. This appears to be the intention of the legislators who supported the provision that ulti-
mately became id § 1532(5)(A)(i)(I). The Senate bill-S. 2899--contained a definition of "critical
habitat," which, with slight change, was enacted into law. See S. 2899, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(1)
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fore, the "essential" habitat for a species could be quite limited in ex-
tent, possibly not even as large as the area actually occupied by the
species. On the other hand, the 1978 amendments also allow for criti-
cal habitat to be established for places not presently occupied by the
206endangered species. Once again, the area must be "essential for the
conservation of the species. 2 °7
The interpretation of this phrase is the major issue to be con-
fronted regarding habitat designation. While paraphrasing the statute's
language to a large degree, recently proposed regulations also state that
species population growth should be a factor to be considered when
critical habitats are administratively established in the future.208 If the
objective of the Act is to encourage a federal policy of species conserva-
tion,20 9 then critical habitat determinations must include the area nec-
essary to bring endangered species populations "to the point at which
the measures provided [in the statute] are no longer necessary.
210
Such a policy seems better served by the recent administrative interpre-
tation than by a more restrictive definition established for nonbiologi-
cal reasons.21
Throughout the 1978 amendment process, the foundation of the
Endangered Species Act, which had required biologically based agency
decisionmaking, withstood most efforts to integrate economic consider-
(1978), 124 CONG. REc. Sl1,158 (daily ed. July 19, 1978). On the other hand, the House bill-
H.R. 14104-left the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee with a proposal to amend
the definition used by the Fish and Wildlife Service to read "any air, land, or water area. . ., the
loss of which would significantly decrease the likelihood of conserving such species." H.R. 14104,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. § (5) (1978), 124 CONG. REc. H12,879 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978). The House
committee substituted the word "significantly" for the word "appreciably" in order to prevent the
designation of virtually all the habitat of a listed species as its critical habitat." H. REP. No. 1625,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9453, 9475. Unsatis-
fied with the committee provision, Representative Robert Duncan of Oregon offered a floor
amendment to make the definition similar to the Senate language. 124 CONG. REc. H12896-97
(daily ed. Oct. 14, 1979).
206. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(5)(A)(ii)(B) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
207. Id § 1532(5)(A)(ii)(A).
208. See 44 Fed. Reg. 47,862 & 47,864 (1979).
209. The statute provides, in the findings, purposes, and policy section, that "[i]t is further
declared to be the policy of Congress that all Federal departments and agencies shall seek to
conserve endangered species and threatened species and shall utilize their authorities in further-
ance of the purposes of this chapter." 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c) (1976).
210. The definition of "conservation" in the Act states in part that the term "means to use and
the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or
threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no
longer necessary." 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
211. An obscure provision taken from the Senate bill prohibits, as a general rule, the designa-
tion as critical habitat of "the entire geographical area which can be occupied by the threatened or
endangered species." See id. § 1532(5)(C). This limitation was undoubtedly inserted into the law
in order to discourage the designation of massive areas as critical habitat.
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ations into the species protection program. One area in which eco-
nomic interests were given direct recognition, however, was the
specification of critical habitat.212 The new section requires that a fed-
eral official designating a critical habitat "consider the economic im-
pact, and any other relevant impacts," of that designation. 1 3 The
official is then given the discretion to exempt portions of a potential
critical habitat if the benefits of exempting the portion outweigh the
benefits derived from designating the entire area.214 Because this
power to exclude habitat215 for economic reasons is discretionary, how-
ever, the FWS and the NMFS apparently can establish critical habitat
on the basis of pure biological necessity, even if there are counter-
vailing economic values.216 As a check on the unbridled use of the
exemption power, the statute prohibits the exclusion of habitat when
"the failure to designate such area as critical habitat will result in the
extinction of the species. 217 This restriction does not appear to bind
the discretion of the FWS or NMFS except when a listed species exists
only in a narrow geographical area.
The inclusion of economic considerations into the habitat designa-
tion process has both programmatic and symbolic significance. In
212. Id. § 1533(b)(4).
213. Id The recently proposed joint regulations implementing this section of the Act reflect
the exact language of the statute and provide no insight into the administrative interpretation of
16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(b)(4) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). See 44 Fed. Reg. 47,862 & 47,864 (1979)
(proposed 50 C.F.R. § 405.12(c)).
214. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(b)(4) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). This comparison of benefits is to
encompass more than economic impacts, although the statute does not specify what other interests
must be considered. In the House floor debate Representative William J. Hughes requested that
these "other relevant impacts" be specifically enumerated in the statute. His proposed list in-
cluded "social, ecological, economic, scientific, archeological, and national security impacts, as
well as any other local or national concerns." 124 CONG. REc. H12877 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978).
The newly proposed federal regulations mention that noneconomic impacts are to be considered
but give no further explanation. See 44 Fed. Reg. 47,864-65 (1979) (proposed 50 C.F.R.
§ 405.12(c) and § 405.15(c)(6)(iii)(A)-(C)).
215. See 44 Fed. Reg. 47,862 & 47,865 (1979) (proposed 50 C.F.R. § 405.15(c)(6)(iii)(D)).
216. The Committee report on H.R. 14104, in which the economically based critical habitat
exemption provision first appears, concurs in this view. In the Committee's discussion of this
section it was noted that
[e]conomics and any other relevant impact shall be considered by the Secretary in setting
the limits of critical habitat for such a species. The Secretary is not required to give
economics or any other "relevant impact" predominant consideration in his specification
of critical habitat for invertebrates. The consideration and weight given to any particu-
lar impact is completely within the Secretary's discretion.
H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
9453, 9467.
217. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(b)(4) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). This language was inserted in the bill
during the Conference Committee deliberations, yet there is no mention of it or the entire para-
graph in the Conference Report or in the brief floor debate during the consideration of the Con-
ference Report.
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terms of the endangered species program, the statutory grant of author-
ity to consider nonbiological factors could result in the designation of
an inadequate area for species conservation.2t8 Instead of designating
an area that is biologically necessary to protect a species, the federal
official could formally recognize fewer or smaller areas as critical
habitat based upon economic considerations.219 The effect of this latter
possibility would be to increase the risk of species depletion and make
it more difficult to anticipate accurately the adverse impacts of agency
actions upon endangered species at early stages in the planning process.
As the Tellico Dam controversy has vividly demonstrated, 220 early con-
sideration of the effects of a project upon endangered species can avoid
costly delays and extensive litigation.
Symbolically, the legislative decision to add economic considera-
tions to the critical habitat determination represents a deviation from
the previous congressional policy favoring the preservation of endan-
gered and threatened species. The pre-1978 law focused upon the sci-
entifically determned status of endangerment in plant and animal
species. The decision to recognize a particular form of life as being
worthy of federal protection was to be made without reference to par-
ticular political or economic interests. 2 Under the legal regime cre-
218. Since the passage of the 1978 amendments, a number of animal and plant species have
been formally listed as either endangered or threatened. In no case was a critical habitat desig-
nated. The reasons given for this omission were (1) that a foreign species was involved and habi-
tats are not specified as a rule for those species and (2) that the species was a plant and would be
made more vulnerable to destruction if a critical habitat was designated. The policy embodied in
Executive Order 12114 (Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions) would seem to
make the first ground questionable. See 15 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 10 (Jan. 8, 1979). See
also 44 Fed. Reg. 21,288 (1979) (Caribbean monk seal); id at 23,062 (Bolson tortoise), id at
24,248 (Chapman rhododendron); id at 29,478 (Totoaba), id at 32,604 (Tennessee purple cone-
flower); id at 42,910 (West African manatee); id at 42,911 (American alligator); id at 43,700
(bunched arrowhead).
219. The proposed regulations--44 Fed. Reg. 47,865 (1979) (proposed 50 C.F.R.
§ 405.15(c)(6)(ii))-do not reflect any bias favoring the exclusion of potential critical habitat ar-
eas. First, the decision to propose a critical habitat will be made on a purely biological basis.
Second, the federal agency involved will begin to accumulate information on the economic and
other effects of the designation. Third, a "draft impact analysis" will be prepared, which evaluates
the data received. Fourth, a "final impact analysis" will be performed to "analyze and discuss
both the beneficial and detrimental economic and other relevant impacts of possible Critical
Habitat configurations." Based upon this analysis, the decision whether to exclude any territory
from the biologically based assessment will be made.
220. In that case, the endangered snail darter was not even formally recognized as a distinct
species or listed until well after the Tellico dam project was initiated. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at
157-62 (1978). The discovery of an endangered species on site during the course of an ongoing
federal project may delay, and could entirely stop, the project.
221. The 1973 Act provided for no exemptions or exclusions from the scope of § 7 analysis,
and, as the United States Supreme Court interpreted the section in TVA v. Hill, once a finding was
made that an agency action had "jeopardized the continued existence" of a listed species or de-
stroyed or modified its critical habitat, the action could not proceed. 437 U.S. at 173. The 1973
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ated by the 1973 Act, protection of endangered species and their
habitats was the singular purpose of the statute. The endangered spe-
cies program could pursue an independent course, unencumbered by
the countervailing considerations frequently found in other federal reg-
ulatory schemes. Unlike other areas of environmental regulation, there
was to be no balancing of costs,z 2 estimation of technological capabili-
ties223 or dependence upon governmental subsidy.22 4 This was an area
of federal wildlife policy to be guided by the findings of the profes-
sional biologist, beyond the political arena and the influence of special
interest groups.2 25 The unique value represented by the endangered or
threatened organism was to be protected by this insulated regulatory
system. The new statutory provision, originating in the House bill,226
raised great concern that the objective, scientific nature of the habitat
designation process would be jeopardized by the discretion given to the
Secretary of the Interior to consider economic effects.22 7 Once eco-
statute, however, did exempt and continues to exempt as a potential endangered species certain
pests whose protection "would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to man." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(4) (1976) (recodified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(6) (West Cum. Supp. 1979)).
222. A good illustration of the consideration of costs in the setting of environmental standards
is the establishment of the "best conventional pollutant control technology" in the Clean Water
Act. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1314(b)(4)(B) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
223. An example of environmental regulation based upon pollution control technology is
found in the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(a)(1), (c)(7) (Supp. 11977) (standard for new sources
performance).
224. The federal government provides significant grant assistance for the design and construc-
tion of publicly owned waste-water treatment works. 33 U.S.C. § 1282 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977).
Effluent limitations for these water pollution point sources are largely dependent upon federal
financial assistance. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(l)(B), (2)(B) (1976 & Supp. 1 1977).
225. There was, however, some indication that the Fish and Wildlife Service had deliberately
failed to list two species of insects living in the vicinity of the ongoing New Melones Lake Dam
project in California for fear of provoking an adverse congressional reaction. See 124 CoNG.
Rac. H12870 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Beard); H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 13, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. N-ws 9453, 9463. These allegations
reflect the practical effects of the endangered species program and the challenges such a single
value system experiences in a world of competing interests.
226. H.R. 14104, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(2) (1978), 124 CONG. Rnc. H12,877 (daily ed. Oct.
14, 1978). The committee bill reaching the floor of the House required the consideration of eco-
nomic and other impacts in designating critical habitat, but only for invertebrate species. This
provision had the effect of potentially weakening federal protection for a life form solely because
of its invertebrate structure; the first time priorities of varying levels of protective concern had
been integrated into the federal program. One legislator spoke in favor of such a distinction. See
124 CONG. REc. H12,881 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Burgener). A floor amend-
ment offered by Representative John Buchanan eliminated this dichotomy by requiring the eco-
nomic analysis for all species-both vertebrate and invertebrate. 124 CONG. REc. H12,898 (daily
ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (Remarks of Rep. Buchanan). In addition, the Secretary was empowered to
exclude any portion of the habitat from formal designation "if he determines that the benefits of
such exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying the area as part of the critical habitat." 124
CONG. RFc. H12,877 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978).
227. Fearing that the new provision would be abused by federal administrators, six members
of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee filed "Additional Views" with the Corn-
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noric factors are used to limit the establishment of critical habitat, a
future amendment might restrict the Act's coverage to limited segments
of wildlife, to animals only, or solely to large federal construction
projects. The opponents of the amendment objected to the provision
not only because of its substantive deficiencies, but also because it rep-
resented a precedent for reducing endangered species protection based
upon a comparison of costs. This would interject into the theory of
federal endangered species law the notion that species preservation was
a relative value, which would have to compete for priority on a case-
by-case basis. The doctrinal shift reflected in the habitat designation
section and the provision granting a section 7 exemption represents a
significant departure from prior policy. It is uncertain whether this
trend will continue in future legislation.
D. Exemptionfrom Section 7 Requirements
In the wake of the TV4 v. Hill decision, the substantive and proce-
dural obligations of section 7 of the ESA loomed as substantial obsta-
cles to federal and federally regulated developmental activity
throughout the nation.228  While two projects-Tellico and
Grayrocks-received the direct attention of Congress, 229 there was in-
creasing concern that, with the passage of time, more project/species
conflicts would arise, requiring the abandonment of projects or the re-
sort to specific legislative amendment." 0 Chief Justice Burger's opin-
mittee's formal report on H.R. 14104. These members believed that the section would grant too
much discretion to the Secretary of the Interior, which could be used to circumvent the policy of
the ESA. The intensity of their belief is best reflected in the following passage:
As currently written, the critical habitat provision is a startling section which is
wholly inconsistent with the rest of the legislation. It constitutes a loophole which could
readily be abused by any Secretary of the Interior who is vulnerable to political pressure,
or who is not sympathetic to the basic purposes of the Endangered Species Act.
H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 69, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
9453, 9483.
228. After TV v. Hill, and the issuance of an injunction to stop the Grayrocks project, the
Endangered Species Act was considered an anti-development statute. In floor debate, Representa-
tive James P. Johnson of Colorado explained his view of the dangers posed by the Act as follows:
Mr. Chairman, I want to follow up what the gentleman from Wyoming said, be-
cause it is not just the Grayrocks Dam which is endangered by the [ESA], but it is every
project in the drainage area of the North and South Platte Rivers. That means every
project from. . . Denver. . ., every project they propose, every water project or storage
project in the towns along the rivers, everything they propose, every electrical generating
plant is endangered by the provisions of this act.
124 CONG. RPc. H12,876 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978).
229. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1539(i)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). This expedited review ultimately re-
sulted in the granting of an exemption for the Grayrocks project but a denial for the Tellico
project. See note 143 and accompanying text supra.
230. The Committee Report on H.R. 14104 noted that, as of September 25, 1978, there were
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ion in TV.4 v. Hill had convinced Congress that section 7 provided an
inflexible standard that granted endangered species a preferential posi-
tion. Under the Court's interpretation of section 7, the biological deci-
sions of the FWS would take on great importance. A finding that a
federal project would "jeopardize the continued existence"2 ' of an en-
dangered species, or "result in the destruction or modification" 232 of
critical habitat, could delay the planning and construction of the proj-
ect and possibly stop it entirely after lengthy litigation. The TV v. Hill
decision led to an attack on the basic policy of the 1973 Act, which
favored the protection of all endangered or threatened species regard-
less of aesthetic or commercial value. Critics characterized the Act as
an unreasonable requirement that would adversely affect regional de-
velopment. The loss of local employment was compared to the reduc-
tion of an "obscure" species to illustrate the insensitivity of
environmentalists to more immediate social needs.233
The result of this political debate was the formation of a new legis-
lative policy continuing the protective elements of prior law234 but pro-
137 animal and 1850 plants species proposed for listing and that the Department of the Interior
estimated that it would formally list 414 domestic species and designate 293 critical habitats before
1980. H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 9453, 9463. Although the estimates of listing prior to 1980 have proven to be far too high,
their mention reflects the concern that project/species conflicts will occur with greater frequency
in the future.
231. Under the 1973 law, the section entitled "Interagency Cooperation" (§ 7) read as follows:
The Secretary shall review other programs administered by him and utilize such
programs in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter. All other Federal departments
and agencies shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, utilize
their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by carrying out programs
for the conservation of endangered species and threatened species listed pursuant to sec-
tion 1533 of this title and by taking such action necessary to insure that actions authorized,
funded, or carried out by them do notjeopardize the continued existence ofsuch endangered
species and threatened species or result in the destruction or modxitcation of habitat of such
species which is determined by the Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with the
affected States, to be critical.
16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976) (emphasis added) (current version at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a) (West Cum.
Supp. 1979), as amended by Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 4, 93 Stat. 1225).
232. Id
233. In defense of the protective purpose of the Act, Representative John D. Dingell elo-
quently noted that many of the "obscure" species, which have been commonly viewed as no more
than curiosities, have provided man with important products and knowledge. He characterized
the effort to ignore these species as shortsighted. See 124 CONG. REc. H12,871 (daily ed. Oct. 14,
1978).
234. The 1979 amendments modified the language and structure of § 7, which resulted in the
formation of three subsections-16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(l)-(3). Each federal agency must now en-
sure that any of its actions are "not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of [critical]
habitat." Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 4(l)(c), 93 Stat. 1225 (to be codified at 16
U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)). It would appear that the previous standard applicable to federal actions has
been weakened to permit a proposed project to proceed despite some uncertainty about the effects
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viding an administratively based system of conflict resolution. This
new system, grounded upon the section 7 obligation of interagency
consultation, will grant, in appropriate cases, exemptions from the sub-
stantive and protective command of the statute.235  The underlying as-
sumption of the exemption procedure, however, is that most potential
conflicts can be avoided through consultation and project modification
early in the federal agency planning process.3 6 Under this theory, very
few cases should reach the cabinet-level Endangered Species Commit-
tee. This new exemption procedure must be closely evaluated in order
to understand the congressional attempt to reconcile endangered spe-
cies protection with the developmental and programmatic needs of fed-
eral agencies.
1. Consultation
The 1978 statute strongly reaffirms the position and importance of
the interagency consultation requement embodied in section 7 of the
preexisting law.23 7 Specific reference has been made to consultation as
a means of avoiding project/species conflicts.23 8 In addition, the 1979
legislation requires all federal agencies to confer with the Departments
of the action. The interpretation of the word "likely" will ultimately determine the strength of the
federal policy. A lax definition of the term could result in an erosion of the precautionary charac-
ter of the Endangered Species Act. The Conference Report discussion of this subject, while reaf-
firming the procedural rigor of § 7, reflects this subtle modification. H.R. REP. No. 697, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4776, 4780.
235. The successful exemption applicant is not totally free to obliterate an endangered species
or critical habitat in pursuing an agency action. If the Endangered Species Committee grants an
exemption, it must specify in its formal order announcing the exemption "mitigation and enhance-
ment measures" that will be taken by the applicant. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(/)(1) (West Cum. Supp.
1979). The statute requires such measures as are "necessary and appropriate" to minimize the
adverse effects of the agency's actions. It also mentions several specific measures, such as "live
propagation, transplantation, and habitat acquisition and improvement," as examples. 16
U.S.C.A. § 1536(h)(1)(B) (West Cune. Supp. 1979). The Conference Report, however, makes it
clear that the required mitigation and enhancement measures must be reasonable in cost and
technologically feasible in application. H.R. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in
[19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9453, 9474.
236. The basic assumption of both the House and Senate committees was that "many if not
most" species/project conflicts could be resolved by early consultation with the FWS or the
NMFS. H.R. REP. No. 1625,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEws 9453, 9463; S. REP. No. 874,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1978). The exemption process would
be reserved for the most intractable conflicts that are not susceptible to negotiated planning modi-
fications.
237. The emphasis on mandatory interagency consultation was strengthened by new language
added to the preexisting § 7. The basic structure of § 7 was retained, but an additional reference
to the consultation duty was included by the Conference Committee to the Senate provision. H.R.
REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9484,
9486.
238. See text accompanying note 126 supra.
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of the Interior and Commerce when an action is likely to adversely
affect a species proposed for formal listing or a critical habitat proposed
for designation. 3 9 Although this new mandate does not impose the
same consultation duties and procedural responsibilities required for
impacts upon formally listed species, it does reflect the practical under-
standing that species and habitats in the process of being listed cannot
be ignored. The amended act continues the existing practice of having
the FWS or the NMFS review proposed federal agency actions to de-
termine their impact upon endangered and threatened species and their
critical habitats. There are no waivers of or exemptions from the duty
to consult, even if an exemption from the substantive standard of sec-
tion 7 is later granted.24 ° Concurrently with the initiation of the formal
consultation procedure, the project agency must seek information from
the FWS or the NMFS concerning whether a listed species or one pro-
posed for listing "may be present in the area" of the proposed action.241
If these expert agencies suggest that there may be endangered or
threatened species in the area, the project agency must then prepare a
"biological assessment" to further identify the presence of affected spe-
cies.242 The apparent intent underlying this requirement is to en-
239. Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No, 96-159, § 4(1)(c), 93 Stat. 1225. In the legislative his-
tory, this new duty to confer is characterized as "informal discussions with the wildlife agencies of
the Federal Government about the possible adverse impact of agency actions on proposed spe-
cies." H.R. REP. No. 697, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CoNe. & AD.
NEws 4776, 4780. Due to the indefinite nature of a listing proposal, the project agency need not
restrict its commitment of resources pending the outcome of its conference. It is clear, however,
that should the proposed species or habitat be formally listed, the full panoply of § 7 protections
become effective "regardless of the state of completion of the project." Id (citing TVA x Hill).
240. The only exception to the consultation and administrative exemption procedure concerns
the statute's grant of Presidental power to undertake "repair or replacement of a public facility
substantially as it existed prior to" a disaster. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(p) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
Even this provision is limited to emergency situations in which the ordinary review procedures
cannot be followed. The only other statutory exemption is provided for Department of Defense
actions necessary for national security. Id. § 15360). A close reading of the statute indicates that
§ 7 consultation is still required, even though an exemption from the substantive policy of the
section is automatically available. This provision was derived from a Senate floor amendment
offered by Senator Scott of Virginia. The discussion of this amendment, however, does not clarify
the Senator's intent. See 124 CONG. REc. S11,147-48 (daily ed. July 19, 1978) (remarks of Sens.
Scott and Culver). A floor amendment to the House bill-H.R. 14104-would have exempted
"military functions" from all provisions of the ESA. See 124 CoNo. REc. H12,898-900 (daily ed.
Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks of Reps. McKay and Dingell). The Conference Report is silent on this
issue.
241. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amended 1979). The statute does not
require that formal consultation and the request for species information be initiated at precisely
the same moment, but it would be logical, in light of the statutory time limits, to do so. See notes
243 & 244 infra.
242. The biological assessment becomes a mandatory responsibility of the project agency once
the FWS or the NMFS determines that there may be an effect on listed species and those proposed
for listing. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). This requirement applies to agency
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courage the production of current biological data that will assist the
FWS or NMFS in making its decision concerning the effect of the pro-
posed project upon endangered species. The timing of the assess-
ment, 243 however, and its performance by the federal agency proposing
the potentially disruptive activity, may diminish the usefulness of the
biological assessment requirement.2'
Once the consultation process has been initiated, the project
agency is precluded from making any "irreversible or irretrievable
commitment of resources," which would foreclose less destructive alter-
natives to the proposed action.245 Although this does not restrain agen-
cies from taking any project-related action,2' it does permit the FWS
or NMFS to make an endangered species impact appraisal without be-
ing influenced by previous expenditures of large amounts of federal
funds. This problem has also been confronted in the context of apply-
ing the NEPA environmental impact statement requirement to ongoing
projects.247 If the proposed activity is later found not to jeopardize en-
dangered species or their habitat, or if an exemption is granted, all
funding can be effectively used to complete the project.
actions for which "no contract for construction has been entered into and for which no construc-
tion has begun" as of November 10, 1978. Id The fact that a species proposed for listing could
trigger this biological analysis reflects the importance of that preliminary designation to federal
agencies undertaking projects.
243. The § 7 consultation is to be concluded within 90 days of its initiation, id § 1536(b), but
the biological assessment need only be completed within 180 days of its commencement, id
§ 1536(c). Both of these time limits can be extended by agreement. Id Furthermore, the 1978 act
allows the biological assessment to be prepared in conjunction with NEPA compliance activities,
id § 1536(c), which suggests that the assessment may be made by a consultant, may be superficial
and may be prepared in advance of the § 7 consultation.
244. The 1979 amendments provide that the biological assessment may be conducted by "any
person who may wish to apply for an exemption under subsection (g) of [16 U.S.C. § 1536]." Act
of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 4(4), 93 Stat. 1225 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(c)(2)). Such a group of "persons" includes the project agency, the state governor, or the
permit or license applicant. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(g)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1979), as amendedby Act
of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 4(7), 93 Stat. 1225. This new section could result in a
delegation of the biological assessment responsibility to the parties most interested in the comple-
tion of the project. Since these assessments "are designed to assist Federal agencies in determin-
ing whether Section 7(a)(2) consultation should be initiated," H.R. REP. No. 697, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 14, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4776, 4781, and since an exemption
may permanently insulate a project from species review, this delegation of an important function
to a potentially adverse party seems inadvisable. Therefore, close supervision of the biological
assessment by wildlife agencies is recommended.
245. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amended 1979).
246. The statute only precludes commitments of resources that would foreclose "the formula-
tion or implementation of any reasonable andprudent alternative measures which would avoid
jeopardizing the continued existence of any endangered or threatened species or adversely modi-
fying or destroying the critical habitat of any such species." Id This could be viewed as a very
strict standard that prohibits even preliminary construction activity.
247. See W. RODGERS, supra note 2, at 766-67.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
The consultation procedure ends with the issuance of a written
opinion by the Secretary of the Interior or Commerce "detailing how
the agency action affects the [endangered or threatened] species or its
critical habitat. '248 Thus, the initial function of the opinion is to isolate
the impact, if any, of the proposed activity. This provision assumes
that the reviewing agency will be able to predict, with a defensible de-
gree of accuracy, the effects of a proposed action upon diverse plants
and animals in many locations. The predictive capacity of the agency
will undoubtedly be challenged. 49 In addition, the Secretary's opinion
must suggest "reasonable and prudent alternatives" 250 to the proposal
under review that would not adversely affect endangered species.25' By
requiring the suggestion and analysis of less damaging alternatives, the
Act places a great burden on the FWS or the NMFS to produce a wide
variety of project modifications within a relatively short time period.25
2
The 1978 amendments have carefully modified the nature of the
interagency consultation process to make it a more formal administra-
tive proceeding. There will undoubtedly continue to be informal con-
tacts between the project agencies and the FWS or NMFS,253 but the
248. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amended 1979).
249. But see note 192 supra.
250. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amended 1979). This same standard,
similar to the "no feasible and prudent" alternative test found in § 4(f) of the Department of
Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1976), reappears in the 1978 amendments as one of the
tests for the Endangered Species Committee to use in evaluating exemption requests. See 16
U.S.C.A. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(i) (West Cum. Supp. 1979); note 140 supra.
251. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amended 1979). It is unclear whether
this list of alternatives could include a "no action" option because the alternative to be suggested
must be one that "can be taken by the Federal agency or the permit or license applicant in imple-
menting the agency action." Id (emphasis supplied). The legislative history behind this provision
is helpful but not determinative. The House report suggests a more limited interpretation of "rea-
sonable and prudent" alternatives analysis. It states:
The search for alternatives in the consultation process should be limited to those
that are "reasonable and prudent." The committee does not intend that the Secretarv and
the Federal agency should, at the consultation stage, be requiredto review allpossible alter-
natives to the agency action including those inconsistent wi/h the project'r objectives and
outside ofthe Federal agency's jurisdiction. It is the intent of the Committee that the
consultation process be completed within 90 days or such time as is mutually agreed
upon by the Secretary and the Federal agency.
H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. N-ws
9453, 9470 (emphasis added).
252. The statute does not specifically indicate when the Secretary's opinion is to be made
available, although the overall intention is clearly to expedite § 7 consultation proceedings. The
statute states that the opinion is to be made available "[p]romptly after the conclusion of [the]
consultation." 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
253. Informal interagency contacts apparently have been common for years in the operation
of the § 7 process. During the floor debate on the ESA amendments, Representative Robin L.
Beard criticized the consultation procedure for being too informal. He noted that "most of these
consultations, at least in many cases, were merely telephone calls. In many instances a dozen of
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rigor of the statutory exemption procedure and the contested nature of
many proposed federal projects will demand that the written opinion
state specific conclusions that are supported by adequate documenta-
tion.254 These factors, in conjunction with the desire of the FWS and
the NMFS to avoid any appearance of impropriety through exparte
contacts,255 will increase the pressure to conduct a more formal admin-
istrative procedure. Considering the great number of consultations an-
ticipated and the importance of the written opinions, substantial
increases in congressional funding will be necessary to enable the spe-
cies review system to function as originally planned. 5 6
2. Review Board Evaluation
The Secretary's written finding that the proposed project may
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or threatened
species, 257 or negatively affect critical habitat, bars any further action
on the proposed project. Once that finding is made, the exemption pro-
cedure must be initiated. The statutory exemption process provides for
a two-tiered review structure. The first level of evaluation is performed
by a review board and the second by the Endangered Species Commit-
tee (ESC). The statute permits an exemption application to be made by
a federal agency, a state governor, or the initial applicant for the fed-
them were placed to the same agency, regarding the same project." 124 CONG. REc. H12,870
(daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978).
254. The written opinion issued at the conclusion of the consultation process has become a
critical administrative determination. If the Secretary decides that there is no effect upon endan-
gered or threatened species or their habitats, the proposed action may proceed without violating
§ 7 of the Act. On the other hand, if adverse effects are found, a formal exemption must be
sought. Consequently, the post-consultation opinion may be controversial and may be subject to
judicial review. The Act's citizen suit provision grants to "any person" the right to seek an injunc-
tion against "violation of any provision of this chapter or regulations issued under the authority
thereof." 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (1976).
255. Such a situation could arise if a federal agency, to which a private developmental firm
had come for a necessary permit, license or financial support, was to act as the agent for the
private interest before the FWS or NMFS. Informal interagency contacts could be hidden from
the public in general and wildlife groups in particular, making the consultation proceeding a po-
tentially biased one.
256. Independent funding authorizations are provided for the operations of the review boards
and the Endangered Species Committee. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(g) (West Cum. Supp. 1979)
(amended 1979). The consultation functions, however, are to be funded by the general authoriza-
tion for the ESA. Id § 1542.
257. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amended 1979). If there is a determina-
tion of "no effect", then the project agency can proceed with its proposal. If later endangered
species were found in the area, a new consultation would have to be undertaken. The decision
finding "no effect," like the "negative declaration" in the NEPA context, can be a fertile source of
litigation. See W. RODGERS, supra note 2, at 755.
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eral permit or license.258 A prerequisite for consideration is a timely
filed259 application detailing how the proposed agency action meets the
statutory exemption standards and describing the completed consulta-
tion process. 260  This application must be fied with the appropriate
Secretary,261 who then forwards it to a three-person review board
formed to consider the exemption request.262 Once constituted, the re-
258. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(g)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1978) (amended 1979). There was some op-
position to the inclusion of the actual "permit or license applicant" in the list of potential appli-
cants for a § 7 exemption. When the Committee report was issued on H.R. 14104, several
members appended their "Additional Views," which criticized this extension of permission to
apply for an exemption. These congressmen feared that the exemption procedure would be
"flooded with cases of dubious merit," and suggested that the state Governor or federal agency be
required to concur in the privately initiated request to avoid a squandering of time and resources.
H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
9453, 9482. It would also be conceivable that the federal licensing or permitting agency, discover-
ing the effect of the action upon endangered species, might choose not to pursue an exemption
while the license applicant would proceed with the appeal. As a matter of federal policy, a con-
sensus of opinion between the licensing agent and the applicant should exist before an exemption
petition can be considered.
259. The 1978 statute required a written exemption application to be filed with the Secretary
of Interior 6r Commerce "not later than 90 days after the completion ofthe consultation process."
16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(g)(2)(A) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (emphasis added) (amended 1979), The
"completion of the consultation process" was never specifically defined in the 1978 act. In the
proposed regulations governing the exemption procedure, the 90-day time limits commences to
run from two different points. For agency actions other than the issuance of permits or licenses,
the period runs from the "termination of the consultation process and the issuance of the biologi-
cal opinion." 44 Fed. Reg. 7777, 7779 (1979) (proposed 50 C.F.R. § 403.02(d)(1)). For actions
involving licenses or permits, the period commences upon the "denial of the permit or license by
the affected Federal agency." Id (proposed 50 C.F.R. § 403.02(d)). This latter starting point
could come after the biological opinion, giving, in the second instance, a longer period in which to
file for an exemption. The 1979 amendments codify this regulatory position by allowing a permit
or license applicant to fie for an exemption "not later than 90 days after the date on which the
Federal agency concerned takes final agency action, for purposes of chapter 7 of title 5, United
States Code, with respect to the issuance of the permit or license." Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L.
No. 96-158, § 4(7), 93 Stat. 1225 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(2)(A)). The legislative
history indicates that an applicant for a permit or license should not even be able to apply for an
exemption until "after final agency action on the permit or license application at issue." Confer-
ence Report, S. 1143, at 14. The finality required is that which would allow for judicial review
under the Administrative Procedure Act. This seemingly requires the permit or license applicant
to exhaust administrative appeal remedies within the permitting or licensing agency prior to
resorting to the statutory exemption process. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Endangered Species
Committee, 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 659 (D.D.C. 1979) (complaint filed). See also I 1 ENvIR. REP.
(BNA) 2193.
260. In response to the command of 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(0 (West Cum. Supp. 1979), tile De-
partments of the Interior and Commerce jointly proposed regulations governing exemption appli-
cations, the review boards and the Endangered Species Committee. See 44 Fed. Reg. 7777-80
(1979) (proposed 50 C.F.R. §§ 403.01-.04). The rules specify the contents of the exemption appli-
cation. 45 Fed. Reg. 23,354 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 450-453).
261. In those instances in whch a proposed action would adversely affect both marine and
terrestrial species, the review board must be jointly convened by the Secretaries of the Interior and
Commerce to consider the exemption request. Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 4(8), 93
Stat. 1227 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(3)(B)).
262. A separate review board is to be empanelled for each exemption application. Of the
three members, one is to be a federal administrative law judge, one is to be appointed by the
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view board will receive a variety of information to guide its decision,
including the exemption application, the Secretary's "views and recom-
mendation," '263 and other testimonial and documentary evidence.
21"
The board inquiry can be wide-ranging, although statutorily imposed
time limits would necessarily restrict the scope of action.
The review board is directed to make an initial determination and
then, if warranted, issue a formal report to the Endangered Species
Committee. There are four threshold findings that must be made. The
failure of the applicant to satisfy any one of the four tests terminates
the exemption procedure, with the result that no action may be taken
on the proposed project. First, the board must find that an "irresolva-
ble conflict"2 6 exists between the federal action and the preservation of
endangered or threatened species and their habitats. This appears to
require a review of the findings included in the Secretary's written
opinion produced as a result of the consultation process. Considering
the time available and the limited resources, it is unlikely that the
fundamental findings of the Secretary will often be reversed. Second,
the re-view panel must evaluate the conduct of the applicant during the
Secretary involved, and the last is to be an individual from the affected state who is appointed by
the President. In order to expedite matters, the appointments must be made within 30 days after
the exemption application is submitted. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(g)(3)(A)(i)-(iii) (West Cum. Supp.
1979). In an effort to encourage state involvement, the statute requires a solicitation of nominees
from the governors of the affected states. The President, however, need only consider this list and
need not make his section from it. Id § 1536(g)(2)(B), (3)(A)(ii).
263. Within 60 days of the filing of an exemption application, the Secretary must transmit his
"views and recommendations with respect to the application" to the review board. Id §
1536(g)(4). This document will undoubtedly be similar, if not identical, to the biological opinion
required in the initial consultation process. See notes 248-52 and accompanying text supra. If
new information or alternatives are suggested in the exemption application, however, the Secre-
tary should attempt to respond to them to the extent possible in the brief period provided.
264. To assist in the gathering of the necessary information, the review boards are provided
with the power to conduct adjudicatory hearings pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act
and to collect data from both agencies and individuals. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(g)(9)(A)-(B) (West
Cum. Supp. 1979). No subpoena power was accorded the review boards, however, even though
the Endangered Species Committee was granted that authority. See id § 1536(e)(9).
265. The term "irresolvable conflict" was specifically defined in the 1978 amendments to be,
with respect to any action authorized, funded or carried out by a Federal agency, a set of
circumstances under which, after consultation as required in section 7(a) of this Act,
completion of such action woud (A) jeopardize the continued existence of an endangered
or threatened species, or (B) result in the adverse modification or destruction of a critical
habitat.
Id § 1532(11) (amended 1979). This test appears to require an affirmation of the initial finding of
a § 7 violation made in the Department of the Interior or Commerce written opinion under the
consultation process. The 1979 amendments clarified this issue by altering the definition so that
an irresolvable conflict will be found when the proposed agency action would "violate section
7(a)(2)." See Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 2, 93 Stat. 1225 (to be codified at 16
U.S.C. § 1532(11)).
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required consultation process266 to determine whether it has acted "in
good faith" and with a "reasonable and responsible" effort to formulate
less damaging project variations. 267 Third, the review board must find
that the exemption applicant has followed the consultation procedure
by preparing a biological assessment as required by statute.268  Finally,
the board must determine that no "irreversible or irretrievable commit-
ment of resources" has been made that would foreclose less damaging
alternatives to the proposal being considered.26 9 Taken together these
threshold tests require the review board to find that the consultation
procedure has been diligently and honestly used to reach a resolution
of the conflict. The statutory duty to consult as a precondition to fur-
ther administrative review encourages compliance with the consulta-
tion procedure of the statute and should serve to eliminate most
conflicts at an early stage. The threat of losing the primary method of
appeal will encourage project and licensing agencies to comply care-
fully with the section 7 consultation requirements.270 With that result,
the 1978 amendments accomplish an important objective of the 1973
Act.
If the review board decides that the exemption applicant has met
all the tests mentioned above,271 it must then prepare a report, which
will serve as the basis for the Endangered Species Committee consider-
266. In order to emphasize the importance of good faith agency compliance with the § 7 con-
sultation requirement, the 1979 amendments specified that the threshold tests must be satisfied by
the exemption applicant and "the Federal agency concerned." Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No,
96-159, § 4(9)(B), 93 Stat. 1225 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(5)(B)). The congressional
intent was to prohibit federal agencies from ignoring their consultation duties by having a permit
or license applicant apply for an exemption. See H.R. REP. No. 697, 96th Cong,, 2d Sess. 15,
reprintedin [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4776, 4783.
267. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(g)(5)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1979), as amended by Act of Dec. 28, 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 4(9), 93 Stat. 1225. This standard seemingly requires some evidence of a
willingness to compromise in the consultation process. Again, the consultation procedure is in-
tended to filter out and resolve most of the project/species conflicts at an early stage.
268. Id § 1536(g)(5)(B)(ii), as amended by Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 4(9), 93
Stat. 1225.
269. Id § 1536(g)(5)(B)(iii), as amendedby Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 4(9), 93
Stat. 1225.
270. An overzealous interpretation of the consultation duty could result in the FWS and the
NMFS being inundated with review requests for tremendous numbers of proposed projects,
licenses, and permits, some having only the most remote possible impact upon endangered species
or their habitats. In a recent case involving project review under the Fish and Wildlife Coordina-
tion Act, the FWS was found to have illegally ignored its statutorily imposed duty to review
agency actions. The FWS had unsuccessfully argued that it had insufficient personnel to dis-
charge its obligations. See Sun Enterprises Ltd. v. Train, 394 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), a]Td,
532 F.2d 280, 290 (2d Cir. 1976). Without sufficient funding, a similar case could arise under the
Endangered Species Act.
271. A finding that the threshold tests were not satisfied is a final agency action and subject to
judicial review. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(g)(5) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
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ation that will follow. 2 7 2 The statute imposes time constraints upon all
the functions of the review board.273 The board's report, anticipating
several of the findings to be made by the Endangered Species Commit-
tee,274 is intended to provide the Committee with data upon which to
base its ultimate decision and order.2" The board is to function as a
factfinder for the ESC rather than an advocate for granting or denying
the exemption. 76 The information contained in the report would dis-
cuss: (1) the existence of reasonable and prudent alternatives to the
agency action; (2) the nature and extent of benefits related to both the
proposed agency action and alternatives less damaging to endangered
species; (3) whether the agency action is in the public interest and of
national or regional significance; and (4) the reasonable mitigation and
enhancement measures that could be considered by the ESC.277 Since
this data will likely serve as the record before the Endangered Species
Committee, its contents will obviously have an important influence
upon the Committee's deliberations. 8
272. This two-level system of administrative review for exemption requests originated in the
House bill-H.R. 14104. Much of the structure and language survived intact in § 7 of the 1978
and 1979 amendments. See 124 CONG. Rac. H12,877, H12,878 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978). The
House bill, however, provided the review board with a more significant role by granting it the
authority to recommend the grant or denial of an exemption to the Endangered Species Commit-
tee. Id The Senate bill-S. 2899--only created a single level of review, with the ESC making all
decisions. See id at S11,158-59 (daily ed. July 19, 1978).
273. Once the review board is appointed, it must reach its threshold determintion within 60
days, unless a longer time period is agreed upon by the exemption applicant and the Secretary
involved. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(g)(5) (West Cum. Supp. 1979), as amendedby Act of Dec. 28, 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 9, 93 Stat. 1225. If the process is to continue, the report of the board must be
submitted to the Endangered Species Committee within 180 days after the threshold determina-
tion. This time limit cannot be extended by agreement. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(g)(7) (West Cum.
Supp. 1979). With the 90 day limit placed upon the ESC's consideration of the exemption appli-
cations, id § 1536(h)(1), a final administrative decision could be required within 360 days after the
initial application for exemption.
274. See id § 1536(h)(1).
275. In the event an exemption is granted, the ESC must issue an order indicating that the
exemption has been made and setting out the mitigation and enhancement measures required of
the applicant. Id § 1536(l)(1).
276. The Conference Report briefly articulated its conception of the review board's role within
the exemption procedure. It noted that "[tihis provision differs from the House bill in that the
board would merely be summarizing testimony and evidence received during the hearings, rather
than making recommendations to the committee [ESC] on compliance with specific criteria. The
board would be expected to describe the various options available to the committee." H.R. REP.
No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9484, 8988.
In spite of the mundane tone of the description, the review board possesses important powers. It
first screens unworthy applicants and later acts as a de facto consultant for the Endangered Spe-
cies Committee by preparing the formal record for its decision and providing a range of techni-
cally feasible and prudent options. Id at 20, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
9487; 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(h)(1)(A) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
277. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(g)(7) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
278. The Conference Report, after describing the review board's report as a factual summary,
550 NORTH CA4ROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
3. Endangered Species Committee Review
At the pinnacle of this complex system of administrative review
stands the Endangered Species Committee. By the time an exemption
request reaches the Endangered Species Committee, a substantial
amount of consultation, review and negotiation has been undertaken to
modify the sponsoring agency's proposal to bring it into compliance
with the substantive policy of section 7. Through this early interven-
tion into the agency planning process, many serious effects adverse to
endangered species should be avoided. Created to make what Congress
considered to be the political decisions2 79 involving the most intractable
project/species conflicts, the ESC is provided with enumerated stan-
dards280 upon which to guide its action. This provision places the ulti-
mate decisionmaking power into the hands of a high-level
administrative body rather than a legislative or judicial entity. The fu-
ture performance of the Committee will disclose whether such a system
can efficiently and fairly resolve the serious petitions reaching it.28'
The 1978 amendments 282 state that the ESC is to consist of six
federal agency officials and one person, appointed by the President, to
represent the state in which the federal project would be carried out,
283
stresses the importance of the document to the Endangered Species Committee. Actually, the
decision of the Committee may be based entirely on the record developed by the review board.
H.R. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprinted/n [1978] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. Naws
9484, 9468. In light of the limited time available to the ESC, in most cases it is unlikely that the
Committee will exercise its authority to conduct a second evidentiary hearing on the exemption
application and instead will reply on the information derived from the review board's hearing.
279. Throughout the congressional deliberations mention was made of the political nature of
the decision to exempt a particular federal project from the command of the statute. This would
be especially true when a species faces extinction as the result of federal action. The ESC also
serves the practical function of relieving Congress of the obligation to consider and specially
amend the ESA for individual exemption requests. See 124 CONG. REc. H12,869 & 12,887 (daily
ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Bowen). On the other hand, Representative James M. Jeffords
suggested that Congress should retain control in the case of possible species extinction by provid-
ing for automatic congressional review of the exemption request. See id at H 12872.
280. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(h)(1)(A), (B) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
281. Aside from the Tellico and Grayrocks exemption decisions, which were made soon after
the passage of the 1978 amendments to the Act, see note 143 supra, there have been no exemption
applications considered by an Endangered Species Committee. Two oil refinery projects, how-
ever, one in Eastport, Maine, and the other in Portsmouth, Virginia, could ultimately reach the
ESC. The Eastport Project is said to threaten the bald eagle and the humpback whale. The Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency denied a Clean Water Act discharge permit after § 7 consultation.
The Pittston Corporation, sponsor of the refinery, has filed an exemption request, thus triggering
the full exemption procedure. See 44 Fed. Reg. 33,721-22 (1979). Suit has been filed to prohibit
the formal consideration of the application until the proponent has exhausted its administrative
remedies within the permitting agency (EPA). See [1979] ENviR. RPt. (BNA) 659. The 1979
amendment discussed in note 259 supra would seemingly settle this issue.
282. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(e)(3)(A)-(G) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). See also note 139 supra.
283. The state representatives on both the review board and the ESC are to be appointed by
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with the Secretary of the Interior serving as the Committee's chairper-
son.284 The Committee may gather evidence and deliberate for a maxi-
mum of ninety days before rendering its -decision on the exemption
request.285 In order to grant the exemption, the ESC must make statu-
torily mandated findings, with at least five of the seven members voting
affirmatively.286 Anything less leaves the status quo of project disap-
proval intact. In addition, the Secretary of State can block the ESC's
consideration of an exemption if granting the exemption would violate
the terms of an American international obligation.287 The Committee
format gives the majority of votes to federal agency officers rather than
state or local representatives, but that does not ensure that a unified
federal viewpoint will materialize. It is also not possible to characterize
the federal membership of the panel as being uniformly pro-environ-
mental or pro-developmental in outlook.
The Endangered Species Committee is to rule on exemption peti-
tions based uppn several specific criteria, all of which must be met.
First, there must be "no reasonable and prudent" alternatives to the
proposed agency action.288 The legislative drafters of this provision
were careful to distinguish this standard from the "no feasible and pru-
dent" test judicially established in Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v.
the President. The House version was changed in reaction to concerns by the Department of
Justice that permitting membership of both bodies to be open to state governors or their appoin-
tees would potentially violate the "appointments clause" of the Constitution, U.S. CONsT. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 2. H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-31, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 9453, 9479-81. Relying on Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118 (1976), Assistant Attorney
General Patricia M. Wald argued that the "administration and enforcement of public law" could
not be constitutionally performed by one not appointed directly or indirectly by the President. By
way of floor amendment, this view was incorporated into the 1978 amendments to the ESA. See
124 CONG. Rc. H12882 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Bowen). In Buckley, the
Supreme Court invalidated the composition of the Federal Election Commission, which had by
statute four of six members appointed by congressional leaders. 424 U.S. at 126-27. The Justice
Department's analysis of the constitutionality of the ESC appointment procedure is probably un-
necessarily strict.
284. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(e)(5)(B) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
285. Id § 1536(e)(7)(A)-(C), (h)(1).
286. Id § 1536(e)(5)(A). In addition, the Endangered Species Committee is only authorized
to function officially when a quorum of five members is present, with no proxy voting permitted.
Id See also id § 1536(e)(10). Consequently, the absence of three Committee members could bar
the operation of the body without regard to the 90-day limit on action. See id § 1536(h)(1).
287. Id § 1536(i). This section is intended to grant the Secretary of State power to block an
exemption that would jeopardize American performance under the binding provisions of interna-
tional law. The Conference report cites several examples. H.R. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 22, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9484, 9490. The wisdom of according
the Department of State such unchecked authority is to be questioned, especially when its techni-
cal ability to evaluate proposed actions and predict "potential impolications," 16 U.S.C.A. 1536(i)
(West Cum. Supp. 1979), is at best unestablished.
288. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(i) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
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Vo/ie, 2 89 which was considered to be so strict that few if any exemp-
tions could be granted. By comparison, the "no reasonable and pru-
dent" alternative criterion was believed to grant the ESC more
flexibility29° in dealing with exemption requests.
Second, the Endangered Species Committee must compare the
benefits of completing the proposed agency action with the benefits de-
rived from another course of action that would not violate the substan-
tive policy of section 7.291 This comparison of benefits is intended to
reflect the strength or weakness of the initial proposal relative to less
damaging alternatives. Furthermore, it must be established that the to-
tal benefits of the applicant's proposed action "clearly outweigh" the
benefit of other suggested proposals.292 This language may require that
the evidence used in the calculus be of a high quality or that the initial
proposal has benefits associated with it that are far greater than those
generated by alternatives. Once again, the function of the ESC is to
develop alternative proposals against which the original course of ac-
tion can be evaluated. If an alternative provides greater benefits than
the original proposal, the exemption must be denied. The variety of
benefits to be included in this calculation is potentially unlimited-en-
compassing interests that are and are not easily quantifiable.293 As a
result, the precise comparison of benefits apparently anticipated by the
statute will actually be a subjective administrative determination that
may be open to dispute. This second exemption test avoids any re-
289. 401 U.S. 402, 405 (1971); see note 140 suora.
290. In a confusing colloquy during the Senate's consideration of S. 2899, Senators Nelson
and Baker discussed the implications of the "no feasible and prudent alternative" test versus the
"no reasonable and prudent alternative" standard embraced by the Senate bill. The former test
was rejected because it was perceived to have limited exemptions to very few cases. The latter test
was accepted because it was thought to allow the ESC the flexibility to consider a wide range of
factors, including environmental and community impacts, economic feasibility and engineering
soundness, in its determination of "reasonable" alternatives. 124 CONG. Rc. S 11,145 (daily ed.
July 19, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Baker). The result of adopting this language is to make the re-
quired finding easier to reach.
291. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(ii) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
292. Id
293. The Conference Report reflects an intent to create a multi-interest benefit assessment
going beyond ecological and economic considerations. It states:
The committee does not intend, however, that the Endangered Species Committee
evaluation should be limited to these criteria. They should also consider the national
interest, including actions authorized, funded or carried out by the Secretary of Defense;
the esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational and scienljfc value of any en-
dangered or threatened species; and any other factors deemed relevant.
H.R. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
9484, 9488 (emphasis added). This statement is taken from the House report on the House bill.
H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
9453, 9472.
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quirement that the benefits of completing the proposed federal project
be weighed against any direct conception of the value of the species
endangered by the activity. Instead, a broad-based evaluation of the
benefits related to less destructive project alternatives stands as a sub-
stitute for the value of the species itself.294
Third, the proposed agency action must be found to be in "the
public interest." '295 This term is undefined in the Act, although the leg-
islative history explains that, "[t]o be 'in the public interest,' an agency
action must affect some interest, right or duty of the community at large
in a way which they would perceive as positive."296 The "public inter-
est" requirement would exclude those exemption requests that can be
characterized as being purely private in nature. Even the granting of a
federal permit or license for a private activity, however, might have
significant social implications that could easily satisfy the test.
Fourth, the project for which the exemption is sought must be of
"national or regional signficance" to qualify for an exemption.297 The
word "significance" reflects the economic or social importance of the
undertaking and has no relationship to the species involved. This pro-
vision was originally intended to restrict section 7 exemptions to federal
projects of national importance. 298 During the development of the leg-
islation, this standard was modified to encompass situations of a lesser
magnitude. Ultimately, the definition of "regional significance" will
determine whether the section 7 exemption will be available to any fed-
eral or federally related action regardless of the geographic extent of its
impact.299 It is likely that all but the smallest projects will be able to
294. The Senate committee, when discussing the "comparison of benefits" test in the Senate
bill, identified the primary reason for rejecting a direct value comparison between the agency
proposal and the endangered species. "The committee recognized the difficulty of simply compar-
ing species value with a proposed Federal action. The balancing of the benefits of alternative
courses of action mandated by the criteria [for an exemption] will allow a more logical compari-
son of the alternative options." S. REP. No. 874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1978).
295. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(ii) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
296. H.R. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 9484, 9488.
297. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(h)(l)(A)(iii) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
298. An early draft of the House bill maintained that one of the criteria for an exemption was
that the proposed project be "required in the national interest." Those House committee members
who filed "Additional Views" as an appendix to the House report were troubled by the dilution of
the standard as finally enacted and clearly expressed their support for a narrower test. H.R. REP.
No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9453, 9483.
299. The colloquy between Representatives Bowen and AuCoin during the House delibera-
tions is support for a liberal construction of the term "regional." In the context of federal timber
sales, Representative Bowen stated that a regionally significant project could (1) occur in only one
state, (2) result from the cumulative effect of a number of individually insignificant actions, and
(3) be found in the regional economic impact of an isolated federal activity. 124 CONG. REc.
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comply with this component of the exemption test.
Should the Endangered Species Committee find that all four of the
prior requirements have been met, it must then establish such "reason-
able mitigation and enhancement measures ... as are necessary and
appropriate to minimize the adverse effects of the agency action. ' '300 In
exchange for permission to complete the project as planned, the ESC is
authorized to impose these conditions, which must be implemented by
the exemption applicant. The statute suggests several varieties of meas-
ures, including species propagation, transplantation and critical habitat
acquisition.310 The Committee, however, appears to have a great deal
of discretion to go beyond this list as long as the choices are "reason-
able." The reasonableness of a particular measure will undoubtedly be
determined by its cost, effectiveness in protecting the species involved
and technological availability. °2 The imposition of these protective re-
quirements could add greatly to the cost of a federal project receiving a
section 7 exemption,30 3 with the result that a successful exemption ap-
plicant could seek judicial review of the specified mitigation and en-
hancement measures.304 Because the statute requires the measures not
only to mitigate the anticipated adverse effects but also to enhance the
condition of the endangered species or habitat, it is likely that extensive
exemption conditions will be imposed. 30 5 By requiring enhancement
actions in addition to mitigation measures, the damaging activity au-
H12,871 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks ofReps. AuCoin and Bowen). Seealso H.R. REP. No.
1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9484, 9488.
These sources would suggest that the "regional significance" test will be easily satisfied in the
future.
300. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(h)(1)(B) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). This language was taken directly
from the House bill without change. See H.R. 14104, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(f)(2) (1978), 124
CONG. REC. H12,878 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978). The Senate bill contained a similar provision,
which required the inclusion of "all reasonable mitigation measures" determined to be needed by
the Secretary of the Interior or Commerce. See S. 2899, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(g) (1978), 124
CONG. REC. S11,159 (daily ed. July 19, 1978).
301. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(h)(1)(B) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
302. The Conference Report lists these elements but acknowledges that others might be con-
sidered. H.R. REp. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 9484, 9490.
303. The statute carefully notes that the exemption applicant is responsible for the costs of the
measures, and in the case of a federal or federally funded project these actions must be authorized
prior to construction and actually funded along with other aspects of the project. 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 1536(J)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). Oddly, these costs are not to be considered as project costs
in any cost/benefit analysis. Id § 1536(/)(2).
304. Seeid § 1536(n). Judicial review of "any decision" of the Endangered Species Commit-
tee is provided for "any person" in the United States Courts of Appeals. Argument over the
reasonableness or inadequacy of the mitigation and enhancement measures set by the Committee
could be heard under this jurisdictional provision as long as a written petition for review is filed
within 90 days of the issuance of the ESC's formal order. Id § 1536(h), (1)(1).
305. There was an unsuccessful attempt to delete the "enhancement" obligation from the stat-
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thorized by the exemption may indirectly result in special protection
for the species that would not have been otherwise available.
The selection of effective mitigation and enhancement techniques
is a critical component of the section 7 exemption procedure. Although
the creation of an exemption violates the strict pro-species protection
theory present in the 1973 Act, the inclusion of mitigation and en-
hancement measures attempts to reconstruct the protective attributes of
the prior policy. There are, however, several weaknesses in the system.
First, the selection of the measures to be imposed must occur in a rela-
tively short period of time within the exemption process.3 °6 Such a
hurried decision could result in inadequate protective actions. Second,
once the exemption is granted, it is permanently effective and cannot be
withdrawn later if other endangered or threatened species are found on
or near the site of the exempted federal action.30 7 Similarly, the mitiga-
tion and enhancement measures required by the ESC's formal order
and accepted by the exemption applicant cannot be modified in the
future, when their effectiveness is known or new species effects are de-
termined. Third, there is no way to secure compliance with the mitiga-
tion and enhancement obligations agreed to by the exemption
applicant. The exemption applicant must only submit an annual report
to the Council on Environmental Quality describing its compliance. 0 8
No specific authority is provided for the oversight of the mitigation
procedures or for the suspension or withdrawal of the exemption if the
required measures are not properly implemented. Once an exemption
is granted and the conditions accepted, there is no continued leverage
to ensure that the federal action taken has as few adverse effects as
possible.3 °9
ute while the bill was being considered by the House. 124 CONG. Rlc. H12,901-02 (daily ed. Oct.
14, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Buchanan).
306. The Endangered Species Committee must make all of its determinations within 90 days.
See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(h)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
307. Id § 1536(h)(2)(A). The 1979 amendments attempted to clarify the question of the per-
manency of an exemption granted by the ESC. As a general proposition, once an exemption is
granted the project may proceed to completion as long as a biological assessment has been per-
formed. This is true whether or not new endangered species are later discovered. Reconsideration
of the exemption can occur only if the Secretary of the Interior or Commerce finds that extinction
for a species not previously subjected to formal consultation or biological assessment will result
from project completion. If extinction cannot be found, then the exemption stands. The exemp-
tion may only be removed if the ESC affirmatively votes to eliminate it within 60 days of the
Secretary's finding. See Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 4(11), 93 Stat. 1225 (to be
codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(2)(A)-(B)). Because exemptions, once granted, are generally per-
manent, added importance is placed on the quality of data available throughout the administra-
tive process.
308. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(J)(2) (West Supp. 1979).
309. Apparently it would be possible for public interest groups to use the citizen suit provision
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In concluding the analysis of the section 7 exemption procedure, it
is worth noting that major emphasis has been placed upon interagency
consultation as the primary means of avoiding project/species conflicts.
If serious consideration is given to the mandated consultation, there
will be more contact in the nature of negotiation between the project
agencies and the FWS or the NMFS. The prerequisites for exemption
demand that consultation be undertaken in good faith. It is extremely
important that the concept of "good faith" contain an element of open-
ness to ensure that important decisions are not obscured from public
view.
Despite the continued congressional support for species protection,
the 1978 amendments do anticipate the possibility that the extinction of
a species could result from the granting of a section 7 exemption. It is
clear that the value inherent in unique life forms will not be protected
in all cases, and that Congress has for the first time conceded that fed-
erally related activities may be authorized even though they cause the
extinction of a species. This departure from the pre-existing policy is
unfortunate and probably unnecessary. All decisions made by the ESC
should be carefully considered and thoroughly explained in order to
encourage public support and survive judicial review. The sustained
performance of the Endangered Species Committee in granting or de-
nying exemption applications will significantly affect the integrity of
the entire consultation and review system. Consequently, the orienta-
tion of that Committee will greatly influence the course of the federal
endangered species program in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
The 1978 and 1979 amendments to the Endangered Species Act
represent the first Congressional reappraisal and redefinition of the pol-
icy embodied in section 7 of the 1973 Act that federal actions must not
adversely affect endangered and threatened species or their critical
habitats. After the TVA v. Hill decision, many legislators perceived the
policy of the ESA as being anti-developmental and a serious obstacle to
an ever-increasing number of federal actions. With the political cli-
mate emotionally charged and favoring the granting of relief for the
Tellico and Grayrocks projects, it was inevitable that some change
would be made in either the procedure or substance of the pre-existing
of the statute "to enjoin any person... who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of [the
Act]." 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (1976). If mitigation and enhancement measures are considered
to be provisions of the Act, this injunctive remedy would be available.
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law. Under these circumstances, a more drastic curtailment of the pro-
tections afforded endangered species could have occurred.
The outcome of the congressional consideration of section 7 of the
1973 Act was to reaffirm both the procedural and substantive elements
of that section. The strong pro-species policy of section 7 was not al-
tered, though slight modifications in the administrative functions of
listing and critical habitat designation were made. Furthermore, the
consultation duty of federal project agencies was thoroughly reempha-
sized in the new procedural structure of the Act, which permits exemp-
tions for federal actions that may reduce endangered species
populations in only a carefully limited range of situations. The poten-
tial for conflicts between species and projects will undoubtedly con-
tinue, but the 1978 and 1979 amendments have created an enhanced
administrative system organized with the expectation that early project
review, negotiation and appeal can minimize the adverse effects of fed-
eral activities. The future will reveal whether such an administratively
based system will succeed in shifting agency attitudes so as to inculcate
a mandate of species protection into all federal decisions.
The recent enactments make endangered species protection a visi-
ble interest that cannot be ignored by federal agencies. If it has done
nothing more, TVA v. Hill has awakened the federal bureaucracy to the
existence of the species preservation issue. A great deal will have been
accomplished if federal officials do not intentionally or inadvertently
plan projects or license activities that have destructive effects on endan-
gered species. Moreover, the new statutory approach reflects a signifi-
cant shift of important decisionmaking authority, at least initially, from
the judiciary to the federal administrative agencies. The structure
transfers a great deal of power to the reviewing federal officials, and it
assumes a large amount of competence and efficiency in the Fish and
Wildlife Service, the National Marine Fisheries Service and the Endan-
gered Species Committees. Congressional financial support for these
agency functions will determine, in large measure, the success or failure
of the administrative system.
In addition, the 1978 and 1979 amendments to the ESA have sig-
nificant implications for the theory of environmental review of federal
actions. Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act must be compared to
the policy of the National Environmental Policy Act, especially its en-
vironmental impact statement (EIS) requirement. NEPA mandates the
integration of a wide range of environmental concerns into the formal
agenda of all federal agencies. It creates a general standard of opera-
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tion, which must then be put into effect through the myriad of agency
actions and decisions required by the organic statutes that define
agency responsibilities. NEPA adds to these obligations the duty to
prepare an environmental impact statement when a federal agency's
behavior will legally constitute a "major federal [action] significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment."310 Although there
has been significant debate over whether the NEPA obligations create
substantive or merely procedural hurdles for agencies to meet, the
trend appears to be towards a more restrictive interpretation of the stat-
ute. 1' Contemporaneous with this development in NEPA law has
been the increased emphasis placed upon specialized environmental
protection statutes, such as the Endangered Species Act, to provide spe-
cific substantive standards against which agency actions can be mea-
sured. The interpretation of section 7 provided by the 1978 and 1979
amendments to the ESA clearly indicate that endangered species con-
servation is an environmental interest that cannot be satisfied by mere
mention in an agency EIS. Furthermore, the amended ESA reflects a
preference in policy that must be seriously considered and accommo-
dated by agency project planning. The emphasis placed upon the Act
as an independent source of power to regulate federal actions may her-
ald a movement away from litigation under NEPA. If the substantive
policy enunciated by the Endangered Species Act results in the effective
protection of endangered species, it would not be surprising to find an
increased number of specialized environmental review statutes being
proposed in the future.
On the more general theoretical level, the enactment of the recent
amendments to the ESA is also significant. For the first time, economic
and developmental concerns have been integrated into an area of fed-
eral wildlife law that has previously been founded solely upon biologi-
cal principles. This reflects a social choice that the nation is unwilling
to preserve and enhance endangered species despite all other consider-
ations. Endangered species protection has become a relative value-
one that does not find uniform support in all circumstances. Although
this result is not surprising in the political world of competing interests,
it does illustrate the idea that all environmental values-including sup-
port of endangered species-must function in a world of compromise.
No interest or value is of high enough importance that it will have uni-
310. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)(1) (1976).
311. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 100 S. Ct. 497, 499-500 (1980); Ver-
mont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
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form priority over all other social or economic policies. In this way,
American society, through its elected representatives, has made a criti-
cal moral decision concerning the relative value of nonhuman forms of
life. It has accepted a policy that in the main protects endangered spe-
cies but also contemplates the possibility of extinction through govern-
ment-authorized action. At least these statutes articulate this social
choice and present a method for making the choices between species
protection and other social goals. In this respect, the legislation serves
a valuable purpose. It has isolated what have previously been unre-
lated and often highly damaging federal actions and has subjected
them to a uniform evaluative procedure and a protective substantive
standard. In so doing, Congress has placed an awesome responsibility
upon the federal agency officials who are to administer the endangered
species program. The future challenge for federal agencies will be to
plan and execute their programs in conformity with the elaborate pro-
cedural structure of the Endangered Species Act and the protective
purposes of the law. It will be the task of others to ensure that this
challenge is met.

